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Abstract 
The debt maturity of U.S. industrial firms decreased over the past three decades. This 
decrease in maturity is driven by the smallest firms for which the median percentage of 
long-term debt has decreased from 53% in 1976 to 6% in 2008. For large firms, however, 
debt maturity has not declined. Information asymmetry plays an important role in 
explaining the decrease in debt maturity, while debt and managerial agency problems do 
not seem to contribute to the decrease. More interesting, we show that firms are using 
more short-term debt regardless of their characteristics. This unexpected component of 
debt maturity is more important than changing firm characteristics in explaining the 
decline in debt maturity and is a result of the new firms issuing public equity in the 1980s 
and 1990s. Our findings suggest that the shortening of debt maturity has increased the 
exposure of firms to credit and liquidity shocks. 
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1. Introduction 
The structure of corporate debt maturity is an essential component of the firm’s financial policy. 
The choice between short-term versus long-term debt can have important effects on real 
corporate behavior, such as investment spending, in the presence of credit and liquidity shocks. 
A firm that uses more short-term debt faces more frequent renegotiations and therefore is more 
likely to be affected by a credit supply shock and to face financial constraints. Evidence supports 
that corporate debt maturity had important real effects for industrial firms during the 2007-2008 
financial crisis (Almeida, Campello, Laranjeira, and Weisbenner (2009)). 
This paper studies the evolution of corporate debt maturity of U.S. industrial firms from 1976 
to 2008. We document a secular decrease in the debt maturity of the typical firm. This negative 
trend is economically important with the median percentage of debt maturing in more than three 
years decreasing from 64% in 1976 to 49% in 2008. Over this period, the median percentage of 
debt maturing in more than three years hit a record low of 31% in 2000 and has always been 
below the 1976 level of 64%. Indeed, the estimated time trend coefficient of the median 
percentage of debt maturing in more than three years corresponds to a yearly decrease of 0.61% 
and is highly significant. If we look at longer debt maturities we find an even larger drop. The 
median percentage of debt maturing in more than five years decreased from 44% in 1976 to 
nearly zero in 2008. This trend is unique to debt maturity as leverage has been stable over the 
sample period with a median total debt-to-assets ratio of about 25%. 
We investigate why this decrease in corporate debt maturity has occurred. We test whether 
the evolution in corporate debt maturity is explained by changes in its known determinants. We 
find that firms with higher information asymmetry are the ones responsible for the decrease in 
debt maturity. In contrast, agency costs, signalling and liquidation risk theories do not seem to be 
consistent with the evolution of debt maturity. However, changes in firm characteristics or 
changes in correlations between debt maturity and firm characteristics do not account for most of 
the documented trend.  
We then test the evolution in debt maturity is explained by the fact that the typical firm has 
changed over the sample period. Riskier firms have listed publicly in the 1980s and 1990s, and 
thus the composition of firms of publicly traded firms has changed significantly over the last 
decades (Fama and French (2004), and Brown and Kapadia (2007)). We find that firms that have 
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become publicly listed over the past decades—new listings—largely explain the decrease in 
corporate debt maturity. There is no significant trend in debt maturity after accounting for the 
year a firm lists. 
There are several theories which aim to explain corporate debt maturity including agency 
costs, asymmetric information, and signaling and liquidity risk. The use of short-term debt 
minimizes agency costs of debt such as underinvestment (Myers (1977)) and asset substitution 
(Leland and Toft (1996)) by making renegotiation more frequent. This allows debt to be repriced 
so that gains from new projects do not accrue to debtholders. Consistent with this agency 
hypothesis, Barclay and Smith (1995), Guedes and Opler (1996), and others find that debt 
maturity is negatively related to growth opportunities and positively related to firm size. Another 
view is that short-term debt is a mechanism to discipline managers reducing agency conflicts 
between managers and shareholders (Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Raman (2005), and Brockman, 
Martin, and Unlu (2010)). 
Signaling and liquidity risk have also been proposed to explain debt maturity choice. Firm’s 
choice of debt maturity can signal private information held by borrowers to outside investors 
(Flannery (1986)). Diamond (1991) argues that short-term debt allows for a reduction of 
borrowing costs when good news are announced, but exposes the firm to liquidity risk (i.e., the 
risk of inefficient liquidation because refinancing is not possible). This trade-off between 
signaling and liquidity risk implies that both very low-quality firms and very-high quality firms 
issue more short-term debt, while medium-quality firms issue more long-term debt. Empirical 
evidence supports that firms use debt maturity structure to signal information to the market 
(Barclay and Smith (1995)), but there is also support for a non-monotonic relation between 
firm’s quality and debt maturity as predicted by liquidity risk hypothesis (Guedes and Opler 
(1996), and Stohs and Mauer (1996)). 
Asymmetric information has also been used to explain debt maturity choice. In adverse 
selection models debt maturity is chosen in order to minimize the effects of private information 
on the cost of financing. The prediction of these models is that firms with higher level of 
information asymmetry will issue short-term debt to avoid locking in their cost of financing with 
long-term debt since they expect to borrow at more favorable terms later. Consistent with the 
asymmetric information hypothesis, Barclay and Smith (1995), Berger, Espinosa-Vega, Frame, 
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and Miller (2005) and others find that firms with higher information asymmetry issue more 
short-term debt. 
We first test if the trend in debt maturity is consistent with the existing theories by examining 
the evolution of debt maturity for different subsamples of firms. We find that the decrease in 
debt maturity is driven by small firms. For small firms, the median percentage of debt maturing 
in more than three years decreases from 53% in 1976 to 6% in 2008. For large firms it is always 
about 70% over the sample period, although there is some cyclical behavior of debt maturity for 
large firms. This heterogeneity of debt maturity across small and large firms suggests that both 
agency costs and asymmetric information can be at work in explaining the decline in corporate 
debt  maturity.  
We investigate the role played by agency costs. We find that firms with lower agency costs 
(as proxied by lower leverage, book-to-market, asset growth, and capital expenditures) 
experience significant decreases in debt maturity. For some of these proxies the decrease in debt 
maturity is even stronger in the subsample of firms with lower agency costs than in the 
subsample of higher agency costs. When we divide firms by proxies of managerial agency costs 
(as proxied by governance index, board independence, and managerial ownership) we do not see 
differences in patterns across groups of firms that could explain the decrease in debt maturity. 
Thus, the evidence does not support the notion that the evolution of debt maturity can be 
explained by conflicts of interest between shareholders and debtholders or between managers 
and shareholders. 
We then investigate the role played by asymmetric information. We divide firms in our 
sample by proxies of information asymmetry, including tangibility, R&D expenditures, credit 
rating, S&P 500 index membership, and NYSE listing. We find that debt maturity falls 
significantly more for low tangibility, R&D-intensive, non-rated, non-S&P 500, and non-NYSE. 
This evidence is consistent with firms with higher level of information asymmetry generating the 
decrease in debt maturity. The evolution of debt maturity for firms with lower information 
asymmetry is markedly different.  
The findings are consistent when using more dynamic proxies or market microstructure 
measures of adverse selection. We find that firms in the subsamples of low institutional 
ownership, low analyst coverage, high dispersion of analyst forecasts and high volatility 
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experience a more pronounced increase in the use of short-term debt. Furthermore, the decrease 
in debt maturity is driven mainly by firms in the subsamples of high illiquidity (Amihud (2002)), 
probability of informed trading (Easley, Kiefer, and O’Hara (1996)), and effective bid-ask spread 
(Roll (1984)). 
The evidence on the evolution of debt maturity for subsamples of firms does not seem to be 
consistent with the liquidity risk nor the signaling hypotheses. We find no evidence that high-
quality firms, as proxied by abnormal earnings or credit quality, experienced significantly 
different evolution of debt maturity from low-quality firms. Maturity matching and tax 
considerations also do not explain the decrease in debt maturity. Finally, macroeconomic factors 
do not also seem to play a role in explaining the trend in corporate debt maturity. 
We corroborate the finding of a decline in corporate debt maturity using new debt issues. We 
find a dramatic decrease in the maturity of new bond issues. The median maturity drops from 25 
years in 1976 to less than ten years in 2008, with a minimum of seven years in 2000. In contrast, 
we do not observe a clear trend in the median maturity of new syndicated loans. These findings 
support our balance-sheet evidence of a decrease in corporate debt maturity. Syndicated loans are 
just a fraction of private debt markets and we cannot observe directly the characteristics, 
including maturity, of small non-syndicated bank loans. However, using aggregate data (Flow of 
Funds Accounts from the Federal Reserve), we can see that the fraction of public debt in total 
corporate debt financing grew from 50% in the 1980s to more than 65% in the 2000s. Thus, the 
evidence suggests that the decrease in debt maturity has taken place mainly in public debt 
markets, rather than in the private debt markets. 
The decrease in corporate debt maturity seems to be related to the disappearing dividends and 
new listings phenomena documented by Fama and French (2001, 2004). They find that the 
proportion of firms paying dividends falls dramatically in the 1980s and 1990s because of 
changing characteristics of publicly listed firms due to new listings by small firms with low 
profitability and strong growth opportunities. We find that firms that do not pay dividends use, 
on average, more short-term debt than firms that pay dividends. Additionally, we observe a 
decrease in debt maturity among dividend payers, but not among non-dividend payers. We find 
the decrease in debt maturity to be significant among the less profitable firms, but insignificant 
among the more profitable firms. We also find a much more pronounced decrease in debt 
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maturity among new listings (less than five years old) than among old listings (more than five 
years old). To further demonstrate the importance of the listing year, we define groups of firms 
according to their listing year grouped by decades. We find that the most recent listing groups 
have a lower median debt maturity than older listing groups. Moreover, within each listing group, 
firms do not display a negative time trend in debt maturity. 
The shortening of firm’s debt maturity seems to be also related to the strong increase in cash 
holdings of U.S. industrial firms documented by Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009). Harford, Klasa, 
and Maxwell (2011) find that liquidity risk is important to explain this increase in cash holdings. 
We find that firms with higher cash holdings use more short-term debt and that the decrease in 
debt maturity is only significant in the subsample of firms with higher cash holdings. There is 
not a significant trend in debt maturity among firms with lower cash holdings. 
We next investigate whether the decrease in corporate debt maturity results from changes in 
firm characteristics and changes in the elasticities between debt maturity and firm characteristics, 
or, in alternative, by changes that are not explained by firm characteristics. We study whether  
allowing the intercepts and slopes of a regression model to change in the 1990s and 2000s helps 
to explain the cross section of corporate debt maturity. We find that the intercepts for the 1990s 
and 2000s are significantly lower than for the 1980s (i.e., the change in debt maturity is negative 
and strongly significant). This implies that most of the decrease in debt maturity in the 1990s and 
2000s is explained by a shift in debt maturity that is unrelated to firm characteristics. There is 
some evidence of changes in slopes, but these changes have limited explanatory power to explain 
the evolution of debt maturity.  
We estimate the expected level of debt maturity with firm characteristics using data from the 
earlier part of the sample and then apply the estimated coefficients to the samples of firm 
characteristics observed in subsequent years. We find that firms are using more short-term debt, 
irrespective of their characteristics. The models’ expected debt maturity systematically 
overestimates the actual debt maturity and therefore fails to predict the decrease in debt maturity. 
When the average regression function for the 1970s is applied to the sample of firm 
characteristics from 1980 to 2008, the difference between the actual and the predicted debt 
maturity is negative and statistically significant in almost every year. This unexpected 
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component of debt maturity is more important than changing characteristics in explaining the 
decline in corporate debt maturity. 
While the most common determinants of debt maturity cannot account for most of the 
increase in the use of short-term debt, the new listing effect is able to do it. There is no 
significant trend in debt maturity after accounting for firm listing year. The time trend coefficient 
in debt maturity increases from a statistically significant -0.376% to 0.139% when we control for 
the decade in which a firm became publicly listed. The importance of listing groups in explaining 
the time trend in debt maturity remains when we also control for the most common determinants 
of debt maturity choice. 
These findings are not directly related to firm age. Our finding is not that newly listed firms 
use more short-term debt and then start using less short-term debt as they mature. Instead, we 
argue that a change in the sample of firms is responsible for the average decline in corporate debt 
maturity. There has been a fundamental change in the nature of publicly listed firms such that 
firms that have been listed over the last decades use more short-term debt. Thus, the decrease in 
debt maturity is concentrated in the part of the economy that has been able to access public 
equity markets because of greater financial market development and a decrease in the cost of 
equity (Fama and French (2004)).  
Our findings suggest that the decrease in corporate debt maturity could have exacerbated the 
effects of the 2007-2008 financial crisis to the real economy as publicly listed firms were using 
more short-term debt and therefore were more exposed to more liquidation and refinancing risk. 
Indeed, the typical firm was exposed to substantial more to liquidity risk than historically at the 
awake of the recent financial crisis. There is, however, some evidence that firms extended debt 
maturity in the first half of the 2000s. This firms’ behavior is consistent with the findings in 
Mian and Santos (2011) that firms engage in maturity structure management by extending the 
maturity of loans in normal times. This is particularly true for firms with high credit quality. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data. Section 3 
analyzes the evolution of debt maturity for subsamples of firms. Section 4  presents estimates of 
regression models of debt maturity and quantifies the effect of changes in firms characteristics on 
debt maturity. Section 5 studies the effect of new listings on the evolution of debt maturity. 
Section 6 presents evidence on debt maturity using new debt issues. Section 7 concludes. 
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2. Sample and Data Description 
We draw our sample of U.S. firms from the Compustat Industrial Annual database. The sample 
period ranges from 1976 to 2008. We exclude financial firms (SIC codes 6000-6999) and 
utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999). Financial and utility firms are excluded because they tend to 
have significantly different capital structures due to regulation. American Depositary Receipts 
(ADRs) are also excluded. We drop any firm-year observations with negative book value of total 
assets. The final sample has a total of 97,215 observations from 12,938 unique firms. 
2.1. Debt Maturity Structure 
The debt maturity structure of the firms is defined as follows (Compustat data items are in 
parenthesis): 
1. Leverage: The ratio of the book value of total debt (TD) over the book value of assets 
(AT). 
2. Debt maturity 1. The ratio of the long-term debt (DLTT) over the book value of total debt 
(TD). 
3.  Debt maturity 2. The proportion of debt with a maturity over two years, defined by the 
ratio of the difference between the total long-term debt and the debt maturing in two years 
(DLTT – DD2) over total debt (TD). 
4.  Debt maturity 3. The proportion of debt with a maturity over three years, defined by the 
ratio of the difference between the total long-term debt and the debt maturing in two and 
three years (DLTT – DD2 – DD3) over total debt (TD). 
5.  Debt maturity 4. The proportion of debt with a maturity over four years, defined by the 
ratio of the difference between the total long-term debt and the debt maturing in two, three 
and four years (DLTT – DD2 – DD3 – DD4) over total debt (TD). 
6.  Debt maturity 5. The proportion of debt with a maturity over five years, defined by the 
ratio of the difference between the total long-term debt and the debt maturing in two, three, 
four and five years (DLTT – DD2 – DD3 – DD4 – DD5) over total debt (TD). 
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We drop observations for which debt maturity variables is less than 0% or greater than 100%. 
Following the literature on debt maturity (see for instance Barclay and Smith (1995)), we use the 
debt maturing in more than three years (debt maturity 3) as our main debt maturity variable.  
Panel A of Table 1 provides summary statistics for all the debt variables. On average, total 
debt represents 27.3% of total assets while the median value is 24.2%. The debt due in more than 
one year represents, on average, 68.4% of total debt, while the debt that matures in more than 
three years is 43.8%. On average, only 28% of debt matures in more than five years. Overall, 
approximately half of the long-term debt matures before the fifth year.  
2.2. Firm Characteristics 
The explanatory variables that we use in our main specification in regression models follow the 
debt maturity literature (e.g., Barclay and Smith (1995), Guedes and Opler (1996), and Johnson 
(2003)) and are motivated by the existing theories, including agency costs, signaling and 
liquidity risk, asymmetric information, maturity matching, and taxes. The variables used are as 
follows (Compustat data items are in parenthesis): 
1. Size: Firm size can be correlated with debt maturity for different reasons such as 
economies of scale and information asymmetries. We define size of a firm as its NYSE 
percentile, that is, the percent of NYSE firms that have the same or smaller market 
capitalization (CSHO  PRCC_F). This relative size measure is meant to neutralize any 
effects of the growth in typical firm size over time (Fama and French (2001)).  
2. Size squared: The square of firm size. Johnson (2003) find a non linear relationship 
between debt maturity and firm size. The nonlinear relation is predicted by Diamond 
(1991) and  implies that the square of firm size is expected to have a negative coefficient. 
3. Market-to-book: This is a proxy for investment opportunities. Myers (1977) suggests that 
the underinvestment problem is more severe for firms with greater investment 
opportunities. We expect firms with more growth options to have more short-term debt, 
since this alleviates the underinvestment problem. Market-to-book is defined as the ratio 
of the market value of assets (AT+CSHO  PRCC_F - CEQ) over the book value of total 
assets (AT). 
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4. Abnormal earnings: Firms with better quality projects are more likely to issue short-term 
debt according to the signaling hypothesis (Flannery (1986), Kale and Noe (1990) and 
Diamond (1991, 1993)). Abnormal earnings are defined as the ratio of the difference 
between the income before extraordinary items adjusted for common stock (capital) and 
equivalents (IBADJ) for time t and t-1, over the market value of equity used to calculate 
earnings per share (PRCC_F  CSHPRI). 
5. Asset maturity: We expect a positive relationship between asset maturity and debt 
maturity if the firm matches the maturity of its liabilities with the maturity of its assets 
(Myers (1977)). Following Stohs and Mauer (1996), Johnson (2004), and Billett, King, 
and Mauer (2007), assets maturity is measured as the ratio of property, plant and 
equipment (PPEGT) over depreciation and amortization (DP) times the proportion of 
property, plant and equipment in total assets (PPEGT/AT), plus the ratio of current assets 
(ACT) over the cost of goods sold (COGS) times the proportion of current assets in total 
assets (ACT/AT).  
6. Asset volatility: We expect asset volatility to be negatively correlated with debt maturity. 
Firms with more assets volatility have higher probability of default and therefore might 
be screened out of the long-term debt market. This variable is defined as the standard 
deviation of stock return during the fiscal year times the market value of equity (CSHO  
PRCC_F) divided by market value of assets (AT+CSHO  PRCC_F-CEQ). 
7. R&D: Firms with more R&D expenses are also expected to hold more short-term debt 
according to the information asymmetry hypothesis. This is defined as the ratio of 
research and development expense (XRD) over the book value of total assets (AT). 
8. Term Spread: The tax hypothesis suggests a positive correlation between the term spread 
and debt maturity (see Brick and Ravid (1985) and Barclay and Smith (1995) for a 
discussion). However, firms might also strategically issue debt of different maturities 
timing the market or in a way to manage accounting earnings (Faulkender (2005)). The 
term spread is measured as the difference between the month-end yield on the ten-year 
government bonds and the month-end yield on the one-year government bonds. 
We report summary statistics for the explanatory variables in Panel B of Table 1. We 
winsorize variables at the top and bottom 1% levels. Firms, on average, have higher market value 
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of assets (about 80% more) than the book value of assets and show negative future abnormal 
earnings. On average, asset maturity is about nine years and asset volatility (annualized) is 30%. 
Panel B of Table 1 also presents summary statistics for other firm characteristics that we will use 
in the analysis. Table A.1 in the Appendix provides detailed definitions and the data sources for 
all variables used in analysis. 
3. The Decrease in Debt Maturity and Firm Characteristics 
Table 2 shows the evolution of the debt maturity structure and leverage of U.S. industrial (non-
utility) firms from 1976 to 2008. We present the evolution of the percentage of debt maturing in 
more than three years (debt maturity 3). The aggregate ratio of the proportion of debt that 
matures in more than three years is 73% in 1976 and only 63% in 2008. The average ratio is 57% 
in 1976 and drops to 46% in 2008, with a minimum of 35% in 2000. The median ratio, reported 
in the next column, shows a similar pattern. Over the 1976-2000 period the median ratio drops 
from 64% to 21%, and then there is an increase up to 49% in 2008, but well below the levels of 
maturity in the beginning of the sample period. The recent increase in corporate debt maturity 
could be related to maturity structure management by firms. Mian and Santos (2011) find that 
firms, especially high-quality firms, extend the maturity of loans during normal times in 
anticipation to loan maturity. 
The difference in trends between the aggregate and the average ratios is consistent with the 
smaller firms being responsible for this trend, since they account with the same weight as large 
firms in the average ratio, but with relatively less weight in the aggregate ratio. We further 
explore this asymmetry in the evolution of debt maturity between small and large firms in the 
next section. 
Table 2 also reports the evolution of aggregate, mean and median ratio of the proportion of 
debt that matures in more than five years (debt maturity 5). We observe a stronger decrease in  
proportion of debt that matures in more than five years than the one for debt maturing in more 
than three years. The average ratio drops from 42% in 1976 to 22% in 2008, while the median 
drops even more from 44% in 1976 to nearly zero in 2008. The evidence suggests that the 
decline in debt maturity is stronger at longer maturities than at intermediate maturities. In the 
remaining of our analysis we use percentage of debt maturing in more than three years (debt 
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maturity 3) as our main dependent variable, following the majority of the papers on the 
determinants of debt maturity. However, the results would be even stronger using the percentage 
of debt maturing in more than five years. 
We test whether there is a significant time trend in debt maturity variables. The estimated 
time trend coefficient and associated p-value of a regression of debt maturity variables on an 
intercept and a time trend are presented at the bottom of Table 2. We find a statistically 
significant downward trend in the proportion of debt maturing in more than three years or in 
more than five years. The coefficient for the median debt maturity is strongly statistically 
significant and indicates a decrease in the proportion of debt maturing in more than three years of 
0.61% per year. 
The average and median total leverage ratios reported in Table 2 also present a negative time 
trend coefficient but the magnitude of the decrease is substantially smaller than in debt maturity. 
Indeed, the leverage ratio seems to be quite stable during the sample period, suggesting that the 
continuing shift from long-term to short-term debt is not related to a structural change in the 
leverage ratios.  
3.1. Firm Size 
We examine the cross sectional variation of the time trend in debt maturity across firms of 
different sizes. We sort firms in three groups using the 20th and 50th percentiles of market 
capitalization for NYSE firms. A firm is classified as small firm if its market capitalization is 
below the 20th percentile, as medium-sized firm if its market capitalization is between the 20th 
and 50th percentiles, and as large firm if its market capitalization is above the median in each 
year. Following Fama and French (2001), we use NYSE percentiles to prevent the growing 
population of NASDAQ firms from changing the meaning of small, medium and large over the 
sample period. The 20th and 50th percentiles lead to a similar number of firms in the large and 
medium groups but many more firms in the small group.1  
Panel A of Figure 1 shows the number of firms in each size group. While the number of 
firms in the large and medium groups is stable around 600 firms over the sample period, the 
number of firms in the small group increases from about 1,100 in 1976 to more than 2,500 in 
                                                 
1 Untabulated results using real assets percentiles are similar to those using NYSE market capitalization.  
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1997. Table 3 reports five-year subperiod and full period averages of the median ratios of debt 
maturity ratio for the small, medium-sized and large firms groups (the initial and final subperiods 
have only four years). Panel B of Figure 1 shows the yearly evolution of debt maturity for the 
size groups. 
Debt maturity is significantly lower for small firms than for medium-size and large firms. 
The full sample period average of the annual median percentage of debt maturing in more than 
three years for small firms is 26%, while for medium-sized and large firms is 63% and 69% 
respectively. The decrease in debt maturity is stronger for small firms. The percentage of debt 
maturing in more than three years drops from 53% in 1976-1979 to less than one-third of this 
figure in 1990-1994 and less than one-fifth in 2000-2004. There is some increase in the debt 
maturity of small firms in recent years, but the median debt maturity is 6% in 2008, which is well 
below the median in the late 1970s, of more than 50%. Large and medium-size firms also exhibit 
a decrease in debt maturity until the early 1990s, but much less pronounced than the one in small 
firms. The percentage of debt maturing in more than three years drops from 72% in 1976-1979 to 
65% in 1990-1994 for large firms, but we observe an increase in debt maturity especially in the 
2000s. Thus, there is no clear downward trend in debt maturity for large firms. 
The final two columns of Table 3 present the estimated time trend coefficient and its p-value 
for the annual median debt maturity for each size group. The time trend coefficient is negative 
and significant only in the group of small firms. The coefficient, which is strongly statistically 
significant, indicates a decrease in debt maturity of 1.4% per year among smaller firms,. 
The evidence on firm size is consistent with the information asymmetry hypothesis, but also 
with agency costs and signaling theories explaining the decrease in corporate debt maturity. In 
the next subsections we try to disentangle these hypotheses.  
3.2. Agency Costs 
Short-term debt alleviates the underinvestment problem (Myers (1977)) because it makes the 
renegotiation an easier process. These agency costs of debt are expected to be higher in firms 
with more leverage and stronger investment opportunities. Table 3 show the average debt 
maturity for high and low leverage firms, and firms with high and low market-to-book ratio of 
assets, which proxies for firm’s growth options. A firm is classified as low if its below the 
median and as high if its above the median of a given firm characteristics in each year. 
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We do not find consistent evidence that the mitigation of the underinvestment problem helps 
to explain the declined in debt maturity. In fact, we find that more levered firms are the ones 
holding more long-term debt on average, but we only observe a negative trend in the debt 
maturity of less levered firms. Debt maturing in more than three years represents on average 59% 
of total debt in higher leverage firms and only 34% in lower leverage firms. Low leverage firms’ 
average debt maturity ratio drops from 61% in 1976 to 36% in 2008. For high leverage firms this 
ratio has a much less pronounced decrease and its even higher at 75% in the 2005-2008 period 
than at the beginning of the sample period (63%).  
The results from splitting the sample according to growth options are also inconsistent with 
the agency costs of debt hypothesis. Although high market-to-book firms show a higher 
proportion of long-term debt (50% on average) than low market-to-book firms (38%), any of the 
groups presents as significant trend in debt maturity. We consider CAPEX and asset growth as 
alternatives proxies of growth opportunities. We find no significant trends in debt maturity in 
any of the groups based on these alternative proxies of growth opportunities. For example in the 
case of asset growth, we find that debt maturity is on average 42% for low asset growth firms 
and 47% for high asset growth firms and the trend is even more pronounced in the low asset 
growth group than in the high asset growth group.  
Recent research finds a link between corporate governance and the structure of debt maturity. 
Harford, Li, and Zhao (2006) argue that firms with better corporate governance, namely firms 
with more independent boards, hold more short-term debt. Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Raman 
(2005) and Brockman, Martin, and Unlu (2009) find evidence that managerial compensation 
affects the choice of corporate debt maturity. Firms with higher managerial ownership tend to 
use more short-term debt. This is consistent with the notion that when the interests of managers 
and shareholders are not properly aligned, managers use more long-term debt than they are 
supposed to.  
We test if managerial agency costs can explain the trend in debt maturity by looking at 
groups of firms based on corporate governance characteristics. Table 3 reports the trend in debt 
maturity for firms with high and low governance index (Gompers, Ishii, and Metric (2003)), as a 
measure of managerial entrenchment. The governance index is a cumulative index of 24 
antitakeover provisions obtained from RiskMetrics. The governance index is available from 1990 
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to 2008. We split the sample in high (above the yearly median) and low (below the yearly 
median) governance index. On the cross section, we do not see a significant difference in debt 
maturity between the low and high governance index groups (64% versus 67%). Moreover, we 
find no clear difference in the debt maturity trends across these two groups. The evidence does 
not support that less shareholder friendly firms (low governance index) drive down debt 
maturity. 
We find similar results using managerial ownership to construct groups of firms. We 
construct a measure of managerial ownership using data from Execucomp. Managerial 
ownership data is only available since 1992, therefore our sample period is restricted to 1992-
2008. The managerial ownership measure is defined as the percentage of shares held by the five 
highest paid executives in the firm. We split the sample into high and low managerial ownership 
firms using the yearly median. On the cross section, we find that firms with more managerial 
ownership, therefore where the interests between managers and shareholders are better aligned, 
hold less long-term debt. This result is consistent with the findings in Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and 
Raman (2005). However, we do not observe a difference in the evolution of debt maturity 
between the two groups.2 
Finally, we use board independence as a measure of governance quality. We construct a 
board independence measure using data from RiskMetrics, defined as the percentage of 
independent directors in the board. This data is only available since 1996, therefore our sample is 
restricted to the period between 1996 and 2008. We define two groups. A firms is assigned to the 
high (low) board independence group if its percentage of independent directors is above (below) 
the yearly median. Consistent with the results on the governance index and managerial 
ownership, we do not find a significant trend in any of the groups. There is no significant 
difference between the high and low board independence groups in terms of debt maturity . 
In summary, we do not find evidence that agency costs explain the decline in corporate debt 
maturity over time. This is true for both agency costs of debt and managerial agency costs. A 
caveat is the fact that governance measures are only available for a sub-sample of large firms 
(essentially S&P 1,500 firms) and years (1990-2008), restricting our sample in both dimensions, 
                                                 
2 Untabulated results using CEO ownership are similar to those using managerial ownership.  
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which limits our analysis. This explains why we do not find a clear decrease in debt maturity in 
any of the groups when using governance measures. 
3.3. Asymmetric Information 
The asymmetric information hypothesis predicts firms with greater information asymmetry to 
have less long-term debt. Flannery (1986) and Diamond (1991) both suggest that debt maturity is 
reduced in the presence of information asymmetry. We investigate if firms with higher 
information asymmetry drive the decrease in debt maturity. So far, we find that smaller firms 
display a stronger decline in debt maturity, which seems to support the information asymmetry 
hypothesis as firm size is negatively correlated with information asymmetry. We further test this 
hypothesis using alternative proxies including tangibility, R&D expenditures, credit rating, S&P 
500 index membership, and NYSE listing. 
We first use tangibility as a proxy for the degree of information asymmetry between insiders 
and outside investors. We find that firms with a lower proportion of tangible assets (PPE) use 
more short-term debt, and contribute more to the downward trend in debt maturity than high PPE 
firms. The debt maturity of low PPE firms falls from 54% in 1976-1979 to 10% in 2000-2004 
and 26% in 2005-2008. In contrast, the drop in the debt maturity of high PPE firms is less 
pronounced and is statistically insignificant. 
Table 3 also shows the evolution in debt maturity for high and low R&D firms. We classify 
high (low) R&D firms as the ones above (below) the yearly 75th percentile of the R&D-to-assets 
ratio. The change in debt maturity structure is dramatically different between these two groups 
over the 1976-2008 period. In 1976-1979, there is no significant difference in debt maturity 
between the two groups. However, the high R&D group experiences a striking decrease in debt 
maturity in the following years. The debt maturity falls from 61% in 1976-1979 to 5% in 2005-
2008 for more R&D-intensive firms, while for less R&D-intensive firms debt maturity does not 
drop over the same period. Thus, R&D-intensive firms are using much more short-term debt than 
they used to, which is consistent with the information asymmetry hypothesis. 
Firms with no credit rating are expected to have a higher degree of information asymmetry. 
We split the sample of non-missing observations between firms with and without rating. Rating 
information is only available since 1986. We expect firms with a credit rating to have higher 
levels of long-term debt, due to less information asymmetry. Indeed, the average debt maturity is 
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more than three times bigger for firms with rating (77%) than for firms without rating (19%). In 
addition, we find a positive trend in debt maturity for firms with rating, while for firms with no 
rating, we find a negative and significant trend.  
Results in Table 3 suggest that the decrease in debt maturity is mainly driven by firms not 
listed in the NYSE and firms that are not part of the S&P 500 index. We find a negative and 
significant trend in debt maturity only for non-NYSE firms and non-S&P500 firms. We also find 
that NYSE and S&P 500 firms have more than 65% of debt maturing in more than three years, 
while non-NYSE and non-S&P 500 use much less long-term debt.  
These findings are also consistent when using more dynamic proxies or market 
microstructure measures of adverse selection including institutional ownership, analyst coverage, 
dispersion of analyst forecasts, volatility, illiquidity (Amihud (2002)), probability of informed 
trading (Easley, Kiefer, and O’Hara (1996)), and effective bid-ask spread (Roll (1984)). We use 
these variables to classify firms into low and high information asymmetry using the yearly 
median as a breakpoint.3 
Table 3 shows that the drop in debt maturity is explained by firms with high information 
asymmetry as proxied by low institutional ownership and analyst coverage and high dispersion 
of analyst forecasts and (asset) volatility. There is a negative and significant trend in debt 
maturity in the groups of high information asymmetry, while there is no trend in the groups of 
low information asymmetry. 
Stocks’ illiquidity is expected to be positively correlated with information asymmetry: more 
illiquid stocks are traded less frequently and by a smaller number of investors, which might be 
both a cause and an effect of the level of information available for the firm. We split our sample 
in high and low illiquidity firms using Amihud’s illiquidity measure, PIN and effective spread 
using the yearly median. Table 3 also shows that the drop in debt maturity is explained by firms 
with high illiquidity, PIN, and effective spread, which is consistent with the asymmetric 
information hypothesis. On the cross section, we find a significant difference between the 
average debt maturity between the two groups: the debt maturity of the more illiquid firms is 
                                                 
3  In untabulated results we obtain similar findings using alternative measures of adverse measures, including 
Amivest liquidity ratio (Cooper, Groth, and Avera (1985)) and the reversal coefficient (gamma) of Pastor and 
Stambaugh (2003)). The Amivest liquidity ratio, gamma measure, Amihud illiquidity, and effective bid-ask spread 
are obtained from Joel Hasbrouck’s website. The estimates of PIN are obtained from Soeren Hvidkjaer’s website. 
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33%, while more liquid firms have a debt maturity of 63% according to the Amihud illiquidity 
measure. 
The information asymmetry hypothesis predicts that firms with more information asymmetry  
use more short-term debt. We find consistent cross sectional variation with this hypothesis. 
Moreover, the trend in debt maturity for groups of firms with high information asymmetry seems 
to suggest that these firms play a key role in explaining the decline in corporate debt maturity.  
3.4. Signaling and Liquidity Risk 
We first test the signaling hypothesis using abnormal earnings as proxy. Table 3 report the 
average debt maturity per year for the groups of firms with high and low abnormal earnings. 
According to the signaling hypothesis of debt maturity, firms that generate higher abnormal 
earnings because they have better projects, are expected to issue short-term debt as a signal of 
good quality (Flannery (1986),  and Kale and Noe (1990)). We do not find cross sectional 
variation that is consistent with this hypothesis. Debt maturity averages 42% in the group of low 
abnormal earnings and 47% in the group of high abnormal earnings. If signaling explains the 
decline in debt maturity, we should see that debt maturity of firms with high abnormal earnings 
should decrease more than the debt maturity of firms with low abnormal earnings. We do not 
observe this pattern. There is a similar negative trend in both groups and the trend is statistically 
significant in both groups.  
Credit quality gives us an additional way to test the signaling hypothesis. We do not observe 
a significant in the use of short-term, debt by firms with investment grade credit ratings. 
Additionally, firms with speculative grade credit rating seem to be using more long-term debt as 
we observer positive and significant trend in debt maturity. In short, patterns in debt maturity 
across credit quality groups do not seem to be consistent with a signaling story explaining the 
decrease in debt maturity. 
3.5. Dividends, Profitability, and Cash  
Table 3 also shows the variation of debt maturity over time with respect to other firm 
characteristics. We first investigate whether the decrease in debt maturity is related to the 
disappearing dividends effect documented by Fama and French (2001). Table 3 show the results 
for non-dividend and dividend paying firms. Firms that do not pay dividends are more likely to 
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be financially constrained and less likely to be able to issue long-term debt. Non-dividend payers 
have on average lower debt maturity relative to dividend-paying firms (29% and 63%, 
respectively). There is a much more pronounced decrease in debt maturity among non-dividend 
payers than among dividend payers. The debt maturity of non-dividend payers debt falls from 47% 
in 1976-1979 to 19% in 2000-2004, while the debt maturity of dividend payers falls only from 
67% to 60%.  
Profitability also seems to be related to our findings. When we split the sample into firms 
with positive and negative net earnings, we observe that firms with accounting losses have a 
significantly lower debt maturity than firms with accounting profits. Again, there is a clear 
difference in the observed evolution of debt maturity between the two groups based on 
profitability. The trend in debt maturity for negative net income firms is negative and significant, 
while for positive net income firms is negative but insignificant.4 
The shortening of firm’s debt maturity seems to be also related to the strong increase in cash 
holdings of U.S. industrial firms documented by Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009). We find that 
firms with higher cash holdings use more short-term debt than firms with lower cash holdings.  
Moreover, the trend in debt maturity is negative and significant in the subsample of firms with 
higher cash holdings, while there is not a significant trend in the subsample firms with lower 
cash holdings. 
Overall, we conclude that the disappearing dividends, profitability decline, and cash increase 
phenomena documented in the literature seems to be associated with the decline in corporate 
debt maturity observed for U.S. industrial firms. 
3.6. Listing Vintage 
Fama and French (2004) document a surge in new listings in the 1980s and 1990s and a change 
in the characteristics of new listings. They argue that a change in the characteristics of new 
listings were due to a decline in the cost of equity that allowed firms with more distant expected 
cash flows to issue public equity. Brown and Kapadia (2007) find that the increase in 
idiosyncratic risk in the U.S. stock market is driven by newly listed firms.  
                                                 
4 Untabulated results using return on assets or return on equity to form the groups of high and low profitability are 
similar. 
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Panel A of Figure 2 shows the number of new firms listed on major U.S. stock markets 
(NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq) in our sample in the 1976-2008 period. We define a new list as the 
first appearance of a firm in CRSP. We can see that new lists surge from about 100 per year in 
late 1990s to 300 in 1980. Over the 1980-2000 period, there is no single year with less than 200 
new listings. After 2000 there is a dramatic decline in the number of new listings to less than 100 
per year and this number has been always below 200 until 2008. This surge in the number of new 
listings in the 1980s and 1990s is consistent with the evidence in Fama and French (2004).5 
We now test if these new listings can explain the decrease in the corporate debt maturity. We 
define listing groups according to a firm’s listing date. The first group includes all the firms 
listed before 1980. The second group includes all the firms listed between 1980 and 1989, the 
third group between 1990 and 1999, and the final group all the firms listed after 1999. We find 
that firms in the most recent listing groups use more short-term debt. Within each listing group 
there is no negative trend in debt maturity. Table 3 reports five-year subperiod and full period 
averages of the median ratios of debt maturity ratio by listing group. Panel B of Figure 2 shows 
the yearly evolution of debt maturity for the listing groups. 
The average debt maturity of firms in the pre-1980 listing group does not display a 
significant time trend, while the other listing groups display a positive and significant trend. This 
evidence is consistent with the downward in debt maturity trend being mainly generated by the 
decrease in the use of long-term debt ratio by firms in the newer listing groups, or in other words, 
by the new firms entering the sample of publicly traded firms. 
Finally, we investigate whether the listing groups findings are directly related to firm age. 
We measure firm age using the CRSP listing date and classify firms as new list if they have 
listed in the prior five year period, and as old list otherwise. On the cross-section, we find that 
new lists have lower debt maturity. However, we can observe a decrease in debt maturity both in 
new and old lists. The decline is stronger in new lists but there is also a significant negative trend 
in the old lists group. We conclude the decline in debt maturity is not fully explained by a 
particular group of firms in terms of firm age. Our finding is not that newly listed firms use more 
                                                 
5 The number of new listed firms Panel A of Figure 2 is slightly different from Fama and French (2004) because our 
sample only includes firms included in Compustat. 
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short-term debt and then start using less short-term debt as they mature. Instead, we argue that a 
change in the sample of firms is responsible for the average decline in corporate debt maturity.  
To confirm that a change in the composition of firms is a key factor in explaining the trend in 
debt maturity, we estimate the time trend coefficient of debt maturity for each firm in our sample 
with at least three firm-year observations. If the sample composition were to play an important 
role we expect to find that the time trend coefficient is insignificant for the majority of the firms 
in our sample. Indeed, we find that for 75% of the firms (6,724 firms out of a total of 8,950 firms) 
in the sample the time trend coefficient is insignificant. Furthermore, there are 9% of firms with 
a positive and significant time trend in debt maturity and only 16% of firms with a negative and 
significant time trend coefficient. These findings suggest that a change in the sample of firms 
explains a large part of the decrease in debt maturity since we find for a large majority firms an 
insignificant trend. 
3.7. Industry Structure 
A natural question about the newly public companies is their effect on the overall industry 
composition of the U.S. stock market. In this section we examine the industry composition and 
the evolution of debt maturity over time by industry. The industry breakdown is based on 49 
industry groups classification of Fama and French (1997). Table 4 reports five-year subperiod 
and full period averages of the median ratios of debt maturity by industry, as well as time trend 
coefficients and associated p-values. The table also contains the market capitalization weight and 
number of firms in each industry at the beginning and at the end of the sample period (1976 and 
2008). 
If typically riskier industries have increased in size because of newly listed companies, this 
could cause a decrease in debt maturity. Table 4 shows that the industry composition of firms has 
changed substantially over the sample period. Industries such as Pharmaceutical Products, Retail, 
Electronic Equipment and Medical Equipment have experienced the largest increase in market 
capitalization weight. Pharmaceutical Products and Medical Equipment are also among the 
industries that had the largest increase in the number of firms. Industries with the largest 
decrease in market capitalization weight include Chemicals, Automobiles and Trucks and  
Petroleum and Natural Gas.    
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The industries with more pronounced decrease in debt maturity we can find Medical 
Equipment, Computer Software, Electronic Equipment, Pharmaceutical Products, Computers, 
and Business Services. Only the Petroleum and Natural Gas industry has a positive and 
significant trend in debt maturity. Other industries with a positive trend coefficient (although 
insignificant) are Construction, Food Products, Communication or Aircraft. 
We can see that high tech industries are over-represented among the industries with more 
pronounced decrease in debt maturity. We calculate the yearly average debt maturity for firms in 
high tech and low tech industry groups using the Loughran and Ritter (2004) classifications 
scheme. Consistent with the idea that high tech firms experience higher information symmetry, 
we find (in untabulated results) that debt maturing in less than three years represents 49% of the 
total debt for firms in the high tech industries, but only 24% for firms in the low tech industries. 
Although both groups experience a downward trend in debt maturity, the trend is much more 
pronounced for the high technology group of firms. 
Our industry results show some important changes in industry composition that play a role in 
explaining the decrease in debt maturity. We find among the industries with stronger decline in 
maturity, industries with a stronger increase in market capitalization weight (e.g., Pharmaceutical 
Products). However, industry effects are not the whole story as we find a large number of 
industries with a negative and significant time trend in debt maturity. There are 31 industries 
with negative time trend coefficient out of which 23 are statistically significant. If industry 
effects were to fully explain the decrease in debt maturity we would not find a large number of 
industries with negative trend. 
To gain additional understanding of the importance of industry effects, we compute the 
average debt maturity keeping the industry weights constant at their 1976 level. Figure 3 shows 
actual median debt maturity by year and the value-weighted average, using 1976 market 
capitalization weights, of the median debt maturity across industries in each year. The lines start 
to diverge in 1985 with the actual debt maturity decreasing significantly more than the average 
debt maturity using 1976 weights. The difference increases to more than 20 percentage points in 
2000. This suggests that a change in the composition of firms within an industry rather than 
industry weights is a more important effect. 
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4. Did the Determinants of Debt Maturity Change? 
4.1. Regression Estimates 
In this section, we make use of the existing models on the determinants of corporate debt 
maturity to analyze if the decrease in debt maturity can be attributed to a change in firm 
characteristics or to a change in the sensitivities of debt maturity to its determinants. We first 
address the question whether firm characteristics have changed over time by running a set of 
regressions that relate debt maturity to firm characteristics. We use the percentage of debt 
maturing in more than three years (debt maturity 3) as dependent variable in all regression 
models. The explanatory variables are taken from the literature on debt maturity (e.g., Barclay 
and Smith (1995), and Johnson (2003)). 
Table 5 shows panel regressions of the determinants of debt maturity. Column (1) shows the 
estimates of an OLS regression. The coefficients of all the variables have the predicted sign, with 
the exception of abnormal earnings and term spread. As expected, the coefficient of firm size is 
positive and significant, while the coefficient of firm size squared is negative and significant. 
These estimates are consistent with the non-linear relation between debt maturity and credit 
quality predicted by Diamond (1991). The coefficient of market-to-book is negative and 
significant, consistent with the notion that firms with more growth opportunities use more short-
term debt to mitigate the agency costs of debt. The coefficient on abnormal earnings is positive 
and significant, which does not support the signaling hypothesis. There is evidence that firms 
match the maturities of their assets and liabilities as the asset maturity coefficient is positive and 
significant. As expected, the asset volatility coefficient is negative and significant. Consistent 
with the results in Johnson (2003) and others, leverage is positive and significant, indicating that 
debt maturity increases with leverage. The R&D coefficient is negative and significant, 
indicating that R&D-intensive firms use more short-term debt, which is consistent with the 
asymmetric information hypothesis. Although the term spread is not positive as expected, the 
sign of this variable is consistent with the previous findings by Barclay and Smith (1995) and 
Datta, Iskandar-Datta, and Raman (2005).  
Column (2) re-estimates the specification in column (1) including year and industry dummies. 
The coefficient results are similar to column (1) except for term spread due to the inclusion of 
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year dummies.6 Column (3) re-estimates column (1) including firm fixed effects. The results are 
similar to column (1) except for asset maturity, which is not statistically significant in this 
specification.  
Columns (4)-(6) present the estimates that replicate the specifications in columns (1)-(3), but 
including a time trend. This allows to test whether there is a time trend in debt maturity after 
controlling for changes in firm characteristics. We find a negative and significant time trend 
coefficient in all specifications. The time trend coefficient in column (4) indicates a decrease in 
debt maturity of 0.12% per year. The magnitude of the time trend coefficient is stronger when we 
include industry and year dummies or firm fixed effects in columns (5) and (6). Additionally, the 
coefficients of the determinants of debt maturity are barely affected by the inclusion of the time 
trend. Thus, the results are consistent with the changes in determinants not explaining the 
decrease in corporate debt maturity.  
We further investigate if there is instead a change in the sensitivities of debt maturity to these 
variables. To account for this possibility we estimate cross-sectional regressions using the Fama-
MacBeth procedure for two different sub-periods: 1976-1989 and 1990-2008. Columns (7) and 
(8) in Table 5 show the results. Column (7) presents the estimates for the first sub-period and 
column (8) the estimates for the most recent sub-period. The results in all specifications are 
consistent with the previous OLS and fixed effects regressions, and all the variables have the 
expected impact on debt maturity with the exception of abnormal earnings and term spread. All 
the coefficients maintain the same sign across the sub-periods suggesting that there are not 
dramatic changes in the sensitivities of debt maturity to its determinants. 
4.2. Robustness 
In this section we investigate the robustness of the regression estimates in Table 5 in several 
ways. We use the OLS specification in column (4) of Table 5 including a time trend coefficient 
as our main specification.  
Since debt maturity is bounded at zero and one, we estimate the model using the logarithm of 
debt maturity as dependent variable and a Tobit model of debt maturity. The results in column (1) 
and (2) of Table 6 are consistent with the ones in Table 5. Column (3) presents the estimates of a 
                                                 
6 Term spread differs across firms in a given year because of differences in fiscal year-end. 
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specification that uses yearly changes in the dependent and independent variables. This approach 
allows us to eliminate the impact of time-invariant unobserved firm characteristics in debt 
maturity. The results are also consistent with the ones in Table 5. More important, the time trend 
coefficient is negative and significant in all models.  
Columns (4) and (5) present estimates of the debt maturity regression including additional 
explanatory variables. The model in column (4) includes additional macroeconomic and firm 
characteristics as explanatory variables. Greenwood, Hanson, and Stein (2010) argue that there is 
a substitution effect between corporate debt and government debt maturities and suggest that the 
time variation in the maturity of corporate debt arises because firms act as macro liquidity 
providers, issuing more long-term debt when the government issues more short-term debt and 
vice-versa. In column (4) we add Greenwood, Hanson, and Stein (2010) variable of long-term 
government share, defined as the fraction of government debt with a maturity of one year or more. 
We expect this variable to have a negative correlation with our dependent variable due to the 
substitution effect between government and corporate debt maturity. We also add the short-term 
rate as additional macro variable, as the firm might react to changes in short-term interest rates. 
The coefficient of government share is negative and statistically significant, which is consistent 
with the predictions and results of Greenwood, Hanson, and Stein (2010). The short-term rate 
coefficient is positive and significant, which indicates that firms use more short-term debt when 
it is cheaper to use it. In untabulated results, we check that other macroeconomic factors, 
including poor macroeconomic conditions (Erel, Julio, Kim, and Weisbach (2011)) and high 
aggregate risk (Acharya, Almeida, and Campello (2011)), do not explain the decrease in 
corporate debt maturity.  
In the model in column (4) of Table 6, we also introduce several additional explanatory 
variables that are used less often in the debt maturity literature: rating dummy, profitability 
(measured by return on assets), taxes, cash (ratio of cash and equivalents to total assets), 
tangibility (ratio of net property, plant, and equipment, PPE, to assets), capital expenditures (ratio 
of capital expenditures to assets) and a dividend dummy (takes the value of one if a firms pays 
common dividends). Rating dummy, taxes, profitability, cash, tangibility, and dividend dummy 
coefficients are positive and significant, while the capital expenditures coefficient is negative and 
significant.  
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More important to our analysis, the coefficient of the time trend remains negative and 
significant for all the models that include additional macro-economic variables and firm 
characteristics, suggesting that these variables do not explain the time variation of corporate debt 
maturity. If anything, the magnitude of the time trend coefficient is now stronger than in column 
(4) of Table 5. The time trend coefficient in column (4) of Table 6 indicates a decrease in debt 
maturity of 0.23% per year.  
The model in column (5) of Table 6 includes additional proxies for information asymmetry 
as explanatory variables. We add institutional ownership, analyst coverage and Amihud 
illiquidity as explanatory variables. The institutional ownership coefficient is positive and 
significant and the Amihud illiquidity coefficient is negative and significant, which is consistent 
with firms with higher information asymmetry using less long-term debt. Analyst coverage is 
insignificantly related to debt maturity. The trend coefficient is also negative and significant in 
this model. Thus, we conclude that changes in these additional firm characteristics do not explain 
the decrease in debt maturity. 
The model in column (6) of Table 6 replicates the model in column (1) of Table 5, but 
including two dummy variables that allow the intercept to shift in the 1990s and the 2000s with 
respect to the 1980s (i.e., 1976-1989). This enables us to test if the intercepts of the model 
change over time in a significant way and also to tell if the changes in debt maturity ratio are 
explained by the changes in the variables included in the regression model. Both dummies are 
negative and highly significant, which is consistent with the changes in firm variables in the 
regression model not explaining the decrease in debt maturity. The coefficient of the 1990s is 
greater in absolute terms than the coefficient of the 2000s, suggesting that during the 1990s there 
is a bigger part of the debt maturity decrease that is not explained by the model variables. 
The model in column (7) of Table 6 replicates the model in column (6), but we interact the 
1990s and 2000s dummies with the explanatory variables allowing the slopes of these variables 
to change over time. The interaction terms with the 1990s and 2000s periods are reported in the 
second and third columns of this specification. There are significant changes in the slopes of the 
coefficient for size, abnormal earnings, asset volatility, leverage, and R&D. However, only the 
change in the slope of abnormal earnings explains the decrease in debt maturity in this period as 
its sensitivity drops during the 1990s. Nevertheless, the model is not able to explain the decrease 
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in debt maturity since the intercepts are still negative and highly statistically significant. The 
improvement in the R-square from model in column (6) to this model that allow for changes in 
slopes is also small (less than one percentage point). 
Finally, we address the concern that the choice of leverage and debt maturity are likely to be 
simultaneous. Following Johnson (2003), Billett, King, and Mauer (2007), and others, we 
estimate a system that models leverage and debt maturity as jointly endogenous using three-stage 
least squares (3SLS). In untabulated results, we obtain similar estimates to those obtained by 
OLS. In particular, the magnitude of the time trend coefficient is not affected. 
4.3. Predicted and Unexpected Debt Maturity 
The previous sections show that changes in firm characteristics are not the major reason why 
debt maturity decreases. This section quantifies the effect of changes in firm characteristics in 
debt maturity and the (unexpected) component of debt maturity that it is not explained by firm 
characteristics. We first estimate Fama-MacBeth regressions for the 1976-1979 period using the 
same specification of columns (7) and (8) of Table 5. The coefficients are the average 
coefficients from the annual cross-sectional regressions and they are reported in the legend of 
Table 7. We then compute how the actual debt maturity over the 1980-2008 period differs from 
the debt maturity predicted by the model. Since the debt maturity associated with firm 
characteristics is fixed at their base period values, variation in the predicted debt maturity after 
1980 is due to changing characteristics of sample firms. The difference between predicted and 
actual debt maturity for a given year measures the change in debt maturity that it is not related to 
changes in firm characteristics.7 
Table 7 shows the results for all firms but also for the subsamples of small, medium-size and 
large firms. For all firms, the first column reports the actual (average) debt maturity for the 
whole sample and the second column the predicted debt maturity. The third and fourth columns 
report the difference between actual and predicted debt maturity and the t-statistic for the 
difference. When the average regression function for 1976-1979 is applied to the sample of firm 
                                                 
7 In untabulated results, we obtain similar findings if we add to the model the additional control variables included in 
Table 6. We also obtain similar findings if we estimate the Fama-MacBeth regressions in the 1976-1984 or 1976-
1989 periods. 
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characteristics for 1990, the expected debt maturity is 53%. The actual debt maturity for 1980 is 
also 53%.  
The difference between the actual and expected debt maturity increases over the 1980s and 
1990s. This difference can be interpreted as the unexpected reduction in debt maturity or the 
reduction in debt maturity that it is not explained by changes in firm characteristics. The model 
consistently overpredicts debt maturity in the 1980-2008 period (the only exceptions are in 2006 
and 2007 where the difference is statistically insignificant). The highest differences between the 
actual and predicted long-term debt ratio is during the early 1900s (1990-1995) when the model 
under-predicts debt maturity by nearly 12 percentage points. The difference between actual and 
predicted debt maturity is smaller in magnitude after 2002. In 2008, the actual debt maturity is 46% 
and the predicted debt maturity is 51%. Over the 1980-2008 period, predicted debt maturity has 
slightly increased by 2 percentage point. We conclude that changes in firm characteristics do not 
explain the decrease in debt maturity as predicted debt maturity has remained quite stable, while 
actual debt maturity has decreased significantly. 
The next columns of Table 7 examine the differences between actual and predicted debt 
maturity for the subsamples of small, medium-size and large firms. As expected, the model 
performs particularly poorly in the subsample of small firms. The difference between the actual 
and the predicted debt maturity ratio increases to more tha 14 percentage points in early 1990s 
and the model systematically over-predicts debt maturity in the 1980-2008 period. In 2008, the 
actual debt maturity is 31% and the predicted debt maturity is 43%, which is similar to the 
predicted debt maturity in 1990 of 45%. Thus, we again conclude the model and changes in firm 
characteristics do not explain the observed decrease in the debt maturity of small firms.  
Finally, we can observe that the model performs much better in the subsamples of medium-
size and, especially, large firms. The differences between actual and predicted debt maturity for 
large firms are negative and only statistically significant in 1981-1982, 1984, and 1988-1995 but 
the magnitude of the differences is much smaller than in the subsample of small firms. In the 
most recent period, particularly after 2003, the model even under-predicts debt maturity in 
medium-size and large firms. Over the whole sample period, we can see that the effect of 
changes in firm characteristics is also small as predicted debt maturity for large firms is 65% in 
1990 and 64% in 2008. 
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5. Effect of New Listings 
We have found that new firms entering the sample of publicly traded firms in the 1980s and 
1990s play an important in explaining the decrease in corporate debt maturity. The average level 
of debt maturity is higher for the most recent listing groups, and none of the listing groups have a 
statistically significant negative time trend. 
To demonstrate the importance of listing groups in explaining the time trend in debt maturity, 
we estimate regressions at the firm level with and without dummy variables for each ten-year 
listing group. The first listing group includes all the firms listed before 1980. The second listing 
group includes all the firms listed between 1980 and 1989, the third listing group includes firms 
listed between 1990 and 1999, and the final listing group includes firms listed after 1999. The 
dummy variables allow each listing group to have different average debt maturity, while 
constraining the time trend to be the same across groups. The results of this analysis are reported 
in Table 8.8 
The model in column (1) of Table 8 shows that the time trend coefficient across all firms 
without including the listing groups dummy variables. The time trend coefficient is negative and 
significant. The estimated coefficient implies that average percentage of debt maturing in more 
than three years decreased 0.38% per year between 1976 and 2008. Column (2) shows that the 
time trend coefficient turns positive (and significant) when the listing group dummy variables are 
included. As expected, the listing group dummy variables coefficients are decreasing through 
time and are statistically significant. The pre-1980 listing group dummy coefficient is 0.520, 
while the 1980-1989 listing group dummy variable coefficient is 0.353. The difference between 
these two coefficients is statistically significant. The 1990-1999 listing group dummy coefficient 
is even lower at 0.328 and the 2000-2008 listing group dummy coefficient is 0.311. 
We have found that firm characteristics are important to explain debt maturity, but they are 
not able to explain the time evolution in debt maturity. The time trend coefficient is negative and 
significant (-0.116 with a t-statistic of -6.01) in a OLS regression of debt maturity on firm 
characteristics (see column (4) of Table 5). Column (3) shows results including listing group 
dummy variables as well as firm characteristics. The time trend coefficient is statistically 
                                                 
8 In untabulated results, we obtain similar findings using five-year listing groups.  
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insignificant. The results also show that the listing group dummy variables are decreasing with 
exception of the 2000-2008 listing group dummy variable. These results show that the new 
listing effect is necessary and sufficient to explain the negative trend in corporate debt maturity, 
whereas firm characteristics are insufficient to explain it.  
One could argue that the new listing effect could be just capturing that younger firms use 
more short-term debt than older firms and as they grow older, their debt maturity will increase. 
Our finding that there is no consistent increase in debt maturity by listing group does not support 
this hypothesis. This suggests that the trend in debt maturity is not solely the result of a decline 
in the average age of firms going public. To more directly examine the role of firm age, we run a 
regression with firm characteristics but including firm age as additional explanatory variable. 
Column (4) report the results. There is a positive relation between debt maturity and firm age as 
shown by the positive and significant coefficient. However, accounting for firm age does not 
have any effect on the magnitude of the time trend in debt maturity. The time trend coefficient is 
negative and significant at -0.131 (t-statistic is -6.66). 
We next run a regression with firm characteristics and age but also including the listing 
group dummy variables as explanatory variables. Column (5) shows the results that support that 
the new listing effect on debt maturity is not affected by firm age while driving out the effect of 
firm age on debt maturity (the coefficient on firm age becomes insignificant). The time trend 
coefficient is also insignificant in column (5). 
The interpretation of these results is that the variation in firm age not correlated with its 
listing vintage is not important in explaining debt maturity. Although firms are listing earlier in 
their life cycle, this is not sufficient to explain the time trend in debt maturity; the listing vintage 
is the crucial effect. A young firm that lists in the 1980s and 1990s uses on average more short-
term debt than a young firm (of comparable size, growth opportunities, and other characteristics) 
that lists in the 1970s. Our findings suggest that the decrease in debt maturity seems to be 
concentrated in the part of the economy that has been able to access public equity markets 
because of greater financial market development in the 1980s and 1990s (Rajan and Zingales 
(2003) and Fama and French (2004)). 
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6. Evidence from New Debt Issues 
In this section, we examine the evolution of the maturity of new debt issues—an incremental 
approach. Guedes and Opler (1996) argue that some issues about the study of the debt maturity 
choice could be better answered using an incremental approach versus a balance sheet approach. 
This setting allows us to take the view of a prospective creditor who analyzes the firm 
characteristics that will determine the maturity of new lending. We study the maturity of new 
corporate bond issues and syndicated loans. 
We obtain new corporate bond issues from the Mergent Fixed Income Securities Database 
(FISD). Our sample consists of bond issues by (non-utility) industrial firms with Compustat 
identifiers. The sample includes 8,283 issues from 1,901 unique firms over the period 1976 to 
2008.  
Panel A of Table 9 shows the evolution of the initial maturity of new bond issues from 1976 
to 2008. The average initial maturity is 15.2 years and the median is 13.4 years. Over time, there 
is a dramatic decrease in the maturity of new bond issues. The median maturity drops from 25 
years in 1976 to only nine years in 2008, with a lowest of seven years in 2000. The time trend 
coefficients of the average and median initial maturity are negative and strongly significant. The 
median debt maturity time trend coefficient corresponds to a yearly decrease of 0.48%. Thus, 
there is strong evidence of an economically important decrease in the debt maturity of new 
public debt issues. 
We have found that the decrease in debt maturity is explained by smaller and younger firms, 
or more generally by firms with higher information asymmetry. Using the sample of new bond 
issues, we examine the composition of the sample of bond issuers in terms of their size, age, and 
credit rating. We expect to find that the importance of small and new firms have increased in 
public debt markets. We also expect to find an increase in the importance of unrated firms and 
firms with speculative grade credit ratings versus firms with investment grade ratings in new 
bond issues. 
Panel A of Table 9 shows the percent of issues by firm size group based on the NYSE market 
capitalization breakpoints in the our sample of Compustat firms. It also shows the percent of 
issues by firm age (new versus old lists) and credit rating (unrated, speculative grade and 
investment grade). There is an increase in the relative importance of small firms, new firms, 
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unrated firms and firms with speculative grade rating in new bond issues. Small firms represent 
15% of the issues in 2005-2008, while they represent only 9% of the issues in 1976-1979. The 
weight of new firms among issues increased from 5% in the earlier subperiod to nearly 30% in 
1995-1999. There is a decrease in the relative importance of new firms in the 2000s (but to 
figures above the ones from the beginning of the sample) that may explain the increase in 
corporate debt maturity after 2002. Finally, there is also an increase in the relative importance of 
unrated firms and firms with speculative grade ratings. Unrated firms represent 18% of issues in 
recent times versus only 5% in early 1980s. The percent of firms with speculative grade ratings 
increased from less than 30% in the 1980s to more than 40% in the 1990s, while the percent of 
firms with investment grade rating dropped from almost 70% to less than 50% over the same 
period of time. We conclude that a change in the composition of public debt issues explains the 
decrease in debt maturity, which is consistent with our previous findings. 
Our data on private debt are from Loan Pricing Corporation’s Dealscan, which contains 
issuance-level information on syndicated bank loans. Each loan can have multiple facilities, each 
of which contains different characteristics. Our sample consists of loan facilities by (non-utility) 
industrial firms with Compustat identifiers.  
Panel B of Table 9 shows the evolution of the initial maturity of new syndicated loans from 
1976 to 2008. The sample includes 113,131 loan facilities from 5,115 unique firms over the 
period 1987 to 2008. The average and median initial maturity is 3.9 years. Over time, there is 
cyclical variation in the maturity of new loans but there is no evidence of a time trend. 9 The time 
trend coefficients are statistically insignificant. Using the sample of new syndicated loans, we 
examine the composition of the sample of borrowers in terms of their size, age, and credit rating. 
There is some evidence that the relative importance of small and young firms increased in the 
1990s. 
Overall, the time series of the maturity of new debt issues shows that public debt markets 
seem to be the main contributors to the decline in corporate debt maturity. There is no evidence 
of a decline in the maturity of syndicated bank loans. However, the syndicated loan market is just 
                                                 
9 Becker and Ivashina (2010) find that bank debt is more volatile and cyclical than public debt, with bank debt 
shrinking rapidly during recessions. This evidence is consistent with the idea that the public debt market is the 
responsible for long-term trends in debt markets. 
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a fraction of private debt market as it does not include small non-syndicated loans. Thus, 
syndicated loans do not give a complete picture of private debt markets. 
To have a complete picture of the volume of private debt versus public debt, we examine 
total nonfarm nonfinancial corporate debt using the Flow of Funds Accounts data, reported by 
the Federal Reserve. We construct the yearly time series of private (bank) debt and public debt. 
For bank debt, we combine the Flow of Funds balance sheet components Other Loans and 
Advances and Banks Loans Not Elsewhere Classified. For public debt, we add up the Flow of 
Funds balance sheet components Commercial Paper Issued by Nonfinancial Firms and Corporate 
Bonds. Figure 4 shows the fraction of public debt (corporate bonds and commercial paper) in 
total debt financing and the fraction of corporate bonds in total debt financing from 1976 to 2008. 
The fraction of public debt in total corporate debt grew from 50% in the 1980s to more than 65% 
in the 2000s. This increase is mainly due to corporate bonds, with the fraction of corporate bonds 
increasing from 50% in 1980 to about 65% in the 2000s. This increase in the relative importance 
of public debt took place in the 1980s and the 1990s.  
The fact that the share of public debt increased together with the decrease in debt maturity in 
public debt supports the idea that decrease in corporate debt maturity has taken place mainly in 
public debt markets, rather than in the private debt markets. 
We next estimate the regressions in Table 5 using the logarithm of the initial maturity of new 
bond issues and syndicated loans as dependent variables. Table 10 presents the results. Panel A 
reports the results for the maturity of bond issues and Panel B for the maturity of syndicated 
loans. We include the same set of explanatory variables used in Table 5. Additionally, we 
include issue type dummies (in Panel A) and loan purpose and type dummies (in Panel B).  
We find that the coefficients on the determinants of debt maturity are in general consistent 
with those obtained in Table 5. The coefficient of firm size is positive, while the coefficient of 
firm size squared is negative, consistent with a non-linear relation between debt maturity and 
credit quality. The coefficients of market-to-book, asset volatility, and R&D are usually negative, 
consistent with the notion that firms with more growth opportunities and higher information 
asymmetry use more short-term debt. The coefficient on asset maturity and abnormal earnings 
are positive. There are also some differences. For example, the leverage coefficients are negative 
in the sample of bond issues (Panel A) but positive in the sample of syndicated loans (Panel B). 
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More important, the time trend coefficient is negative and significant in the sample of bond 
issues, while is positive in the sample of syndicated loans. In summary, the regression models 
evidence from new public debt issues is consistent with a decrease in maturity controlling for 
changes in firm characteristics. In contrast, there is no evidence of a decline in maturity in 
private debt markets. 
7. Conclusion 
We document a secular decrease in corporate debt maturity of U.S. industrial firms from 1976 to 
2008. We show that this decrease in corporate debt maturity is concentrated among small firms, 
with the median percentage of debt maturing in more than three years decreasing from 53% in 
1976 to 7% in 2008. For large firms, however, debt maturity has not declined over the same 
period.  
We find that firms with higher degree of information asymmetry are responsible for the 
decrease in corporate debt maturity. Agency costs of debt and agency problems between 
managers and shareholders do not contribute to explain the decrease in debt maturity. Maturity 
matching, taxes considerations or macroeconomic factors also do not explain the decrease in 
corporate debt maturity. 
We investigate whether changes in firm characteristics or changes in the correlations between 
debt maturity and its determinants could explain why firms are using more short-term debt. The 
answer is no as we find that firms are using more short-term debt regardless of their 
characteristics. The unexpected component of debt maturity is more important than changing 
firm characteristics in explaining the decline in corporate debt maturity of U.S. industrial firms in 
the 1980s and 1990s.  
We find that new firms issuing public equity in the 1980s and 1990s are responsible for the 
decrease in corporate debt maturity. Consistent with the information asymmetry hypothesis, 
firms listed in recent decades use much more short-term debt than older firms. We also find that 
there is no trend in debt maturity when we take into account the firm’s listing vintage. Moreover, 
we find that the decrease in debt maturity has mainly taken place in public debt markets, rather 
than in private debt markets. Our findings suggest that the decrease in corporate debt maturity is 
concentrated in the part of the economy that has been able to access public equity markets 
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because of greater financial market development and a decrease in the cost of equity. The 
shortening of corporate debt maturity has increased the exposure of firms to credit and liquidity 
shocks, which may have exacerbated the effects of the 2007-2008 financial crisis to the real 
sector. 
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Table 1 
Summary Statistics 
This table reports the mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, maximum, and number of observations for debt 
maturity structure variables in Panel A and other firm characteristics in Panel B. The sample consists of observations 
on Compustat firms from 1976 to 2008. Financial industries (SIC codes 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC codes 4900-
4999) are omitted. Refer to Table A.1 in the Appendix for variables definitions.  
 
Mean Median
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum Obs.
Leverage 0.273 0.242 0.207 0.000 1.000 97,215
Debt maturity 1 0.684 0.814 0.323 0.000 1.000 97,215
Debt maturity 2 0.545 0.631 0.345 0.000 1.000 97,215
Debt maturity 3 0.438 0.460 0.343 0.000 1.000 97,215
Debt maturity 4 0.354 0.314 0.327 0.000 1.000 96,975
Debt maturity 5 0.280 0.179 0.300 0.000 1.000 95,411
Mean Median
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum Obs.
Market capitalization 1,348 73 9,394 0 508,330 97,215
Size 0.242 0.104 0.285 0.000 1.000 97,215
Market-to-book 1.847 1.306 2.024 0.533 30.980 97,215
Abnormal earnings -0.029 0.007 0.497 -3.021 3.080 97,215
Asset maturity 9.263 6.536 9.995 0.184 85.804 97,215
Asset volatility 0.301 0.225 0.252 0.024 1.465 97,215
R&D 0.040 0.000 0.098 0.000 0.784 97,215
Age 14.026 9.000 14.908 0.000 83.000 97,215
CAPEX 0.074 0.050 0.076 0.000 0.455 96,141
Asset growth 0.233 0.077 0.755 -0.690 6.518 97,215
PPE 0.317 0.268 0.222 0.000 0.917 97,212
Rating dummy 0.235 0.000 0.424 0.000 1.000 70,209
Investment grade dummy 0.112 0.000 0.316 0.000 1.000 70,209
Speculative grade dummy 0.122 0.000 0.327 0.000 1.000 70,209
S&P 500 dummy 0.076 0.000 0.264 0.000 1.000 97,201
NYSE dummy 0.308 0.000 0.462 0.000 1.000 97,215
Institutional ownership 0.304 0.231 0.279 0.000 0.975 87,389
Analyst coverage 3.167 0.000 5.757 0.000 50.000 97,215
Dispersion of analyst forecasts 0.043 0.007 0.113 0.000 0.835 36,660
Amihud illiquidity 4.779 0.220 14.727 0.000 103.908 70,828
PIN 0.209 0.199 0.078 0.024 0.910 23,057
Roll effective spread 0.011 0.006 0.014 0.000 0.067 70,828
Positive net income 0.678 1.000 0.467 0.000 1.000 97,215
Return on assets 0.059 0.118 0.285 -3.231 0.443 97,213
Dividend dummy 0.370 0.000 0.483 0.000 1.000 97,215
Cash 0.131 0.061 0.174 0.000 0.921 97,207
Taxes 0.259 0.347 0.269 -0.917 1.036 97,205
Governance index 9.152 9.000 2.750 2.000 19.000 16,907
Managerial ownership 0.010 0.002 0.026 0.000 0.946 16,352
Board independence 0.658 0.688 0.184 0.000 1.000 11,245
Term spread 1.046 0.940 1.155 -3.160 3.310 97,215
Short-term rate 6.323 5.720 3.170 0.370 16.970 97,215
Government share 62.370 65.510 7.606 42.850 72.480 97,215
Panel A: Debt Maturity Structure
Panel B: Firm Characteristics
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Table 2 
Average and Median Debt Maturity and Debt Ratios by Year 
This table reports the aggregate, average and median and number of observations of debt maturity and leverage by 
year. Debt maturity 3 is the percentage of debt maturing in more than three years and debt maturity 5 is the 
percentage of debt maturing in more than five years. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to total assets. The sample 
consists of observations on Compustat firms from 1976 to 2008. Financial industries (SIC codes 6000-6999) and 
utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999) are omitted. Refer to Table A.1 in the Appendix for variables definitions. 
 
Year
Aggregate 
Debt 
Maturity 3
Average 
Debt 
Maturity 3
Median 
Debt 
Maturity 3
Aggregate 
Debt 
Maturity 5
Average 
Debt 
Maturity 5
Median 
Debt 
Maturity 5
Average 
Leverage
Median 
Leverage Obs.
1976 0.731 0.568 0.635 0.622 0.419 0.444 0.267 0.247 2,339    
1977 0.721 0.570 0.634 0.609 0.420 0.441 0.274 0.257 2,385    
1978 0.714 0.561 0.621 0.590 0.403 0.425 0.282 0.269 2,520    
1979 0.689 0.535 0.593 0.571 0.385 0.396 0.288 0.273 2,582    
1980 0.700 0.530 0.592 0.572 0.379 0.387 0.281 0.258 2,613    
1981 0.689 0.510 0.568 0.553 0.358 0.357 0.274 0.248 2,724    
1982 0.693 0.503 0.564 0.553 0.347 0.346 0.281 0.251 2,765    
1983 0.709 0.487 0.543 0.571 0.336 0.332 0.262 0.225 2,995    
1984 0.664 0.459 0.497 0.511 0.308 0.277 0.272 0.236 3,051    
1985 0.687 0.455 0.480 0.529 0.315 0.269 0.285 0.251 3,032    
1986 0.694 0.443 0.464 0.548 0.308 0.246 0.291 0.261 3,134    
1987 0.697 0.440 0.461 0.532 0.299 0.217 0.297 0.269 3,272    
1988 0.583 0.420 0.427 0.442 0.280 0.182 0.299 0.268 3,179    
1989 0.545 0.405 0.397 0.414 0.268 0.161 0.306 0.276 3,037    
1990 0.507 0.384 0.353 0.372 0.244 0.124 0.303 0.268 3,011    
1991 0.549 0.381 0.342 0.419 0.234 0.093 0.284 0.252 3,018    
1992 0.526 0.372 0.331 0.385 0.227 0.074 0.266 0.232 3,207    
1993 0.522 0.380 0.329 0.387 0.238 0.077 0.252 0.223 3,338    
1994 0.559 0.383 0.320 0.401 0.233 0.067 0.257 0.228 3,527    
1995 0.553 0.384 0.320 0.372 0.229 0.052 0.262 0.235 3,630    
1996 0.575 0.394 0.323 0.389 0.232 0.046 0.253 0.217 3,849    
1997 0.585 0.409 0.345 0.392 0.241 0.041 0.265 0.229 3,815    
1998 0.588 0.409 0.352 0.402 0.233 0.032 0.289 0.253 3,676    
1999 0.564 0.381 0.312 0.404 0.222 0.019 0.282 0.252 3,425    
2000 0.529 0.346 0.212 0.372 0.201 0.008 0.266 0.237 3,287    
2001 0.562 0.363 0.251 0.382 0.209 0.005 0.269 0.231 2,931    
2002 0.575 0.381 0.313 0.393 0.218 0.011 0.267 0.229 2,699    
2003 0.573 0.423 0.419 0.422 0.252 0.053 0.250 0.215 2,461    
2004 0.578 0.459 0.485 0.421 0.275 0.070 0.240 0.202 2,442    
2005 0.604 0.481 0.520 0.437 0.286 0.071 0.240 0.202 2,398    
2006 0.636 0.506 0.584 0.434 0.292 0.087 0.247 0.211 2,355    
2007 0.651 0.499 0.565 0.434 0.267 0.030 0.259 0.222 2,316    
2008 0.627 0.456 0.494 0.411 0.224 0.009 0.285 0.245 2,202    
1976-1979 0.713 0.558 0.621 0.598 0.407 0.427 0.278 0.262 2,457    
1980-1984 0.691 0.498 0.553 0.552 0.346 0.340 0.274 0.244 2,830    
1985-1989 0.641 0.433 0.446 0.493 0.294 0.215 0.295 0.265 3,131    
1990-1994 0.532 0.380 0.335 0.393 0.235 0.087 0.272 0.241 3,220    
1995-1999 0.573 0.396 0.331 0.392 0.231 0.038 0.270 0.237 3,679    
2000-2004 0.563 0.394 0.336 0.398 0.231 0.030 0.259 0.223 2,764    
2005-2008 0.630 0.485 0.541 0.429 0.267 0.049 0.258 0.220 2,318    
1976-2008 0.617 0.445 0.444 0.462 0.284 0.165 0.273 0.242 2,946    
Time trend x100 -0.441 -0.348 -0.610 -0.680 -0.524 -1.424 -0.085 -0.140
p-value 0.000 0.002 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.000
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Table 3 
Median Debt Maturity by Group of Firms 
This table reports median debt maturity defined as the percentage of debt maturing in more than three years. The 
breakpoints for the three size groups are the 20th and 50th NYSE percentiles of market capitalization in each year. 
The breakpoint for the low and high groups is the yearly 50th percentile of each firm characteristic. The sample 
consists of observations on Compustat firms from 1976 to 2008. Financial industries (SIC codes 6000-6999) and 
utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999) are omitted. Refer to Table A.1 in the Appendix for variables definitions. 
 
1976-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-08 1976-08
Time Trend 
x100 p-value
Size
Small 0.525 0.439 0.282 0.165 0.157 0.093 0.172 0.256 -1.387 0.000
Medium 0.681 0.646 0.614 0.536 0.592 0.588 0.782 0.628 0.100 0.560
Large 0.721 0.688 0.700 0.654 0.674 0.685 0.722 0.690 -0.029 0.647
Leverage
Low 0.612 0.521 0.384 0.226 0.176 0.148 0.357 0.338 -1.309 0.000
High 0.630 0.591 0.527 0.505 0.594 0.586 0.752 0.592 0.305 0.059
Market-to-book
Low 0.616 0.582 0.494 0.409 0.433 0.394 0.581 0.495 -0.421 0.030
High 0.628 0.518 0.382 0.249 0.216 0.252 0.486 0.380 -0.867 0.001
CAPEX
Low 0.569 0.513 0.362 0.245 0.216 0.228 0.420 0.357 -0.886 0.000
High 0.663 0.589 0.518 0.424 0.439 0.420 0.620 0.518 -0.433 0.021
Asset growth
Low 0.615 0.539 0.418 0.338 0.327 0.251 0.492 0.418 -0.792 0.001
High 0.626 0.567 0.473 0.336 0.340 0.406 0.577 0.468 -0.475 0.031
Governance index
Low 0.615 0.647 0.611 0.692 0.638 0.394 0.047
High 0.637 0.687 0.653 0.691 0.666 0.222 0.084
Managerial ownership
Low 0.649 0.661 0.638 0.698 0.661 0.292 0.121
High 0.582 0.618 0.604 0.702 0.627 0.699 0.005
Board independence
Low 0.661 0.628 0.705 0.662 0.437 0.153
High 0.685 0.651 0.690 0.673 0.112 0.739
Asset maturity
Low 0.539 0.453 0.277 0.176 0.131 0.146 0.351 0.287 -1.005 0.000
High 0.682 0.627 0.568 0.487 0.513 0.487 0.647 0.567 -0.348 0.021
R&D
Low 0.626 0.571 0.496 0.413 0.457 0.463 0.624 0.515 -0.210 0.201
High 0.605 0.486 0.261 0.113 0.038 0.006 0.054 0.217 -2.097 0.000
PPE
Low 0.540 0.460 0.270 0.151 0.098 0.098 0.261 0.260 -1.302 0.000
High 0.683 0.626 0.570 0.506 0.548 0.516 0.676 0.584 -0.214 0.123
Rating
Non-rated 0.311 0.221 0.159 0.090 0.194 0.190 -0.792 0.001
Rated 0.754 0.732 0.792 0.754 0.805 0.766 0.265 0.019
S&P 500 dummy
Non-S&P 500 0.614 0.543 0.426 0.307 0.293 0.261 0.478 0.410 -0.849 0.000
S&P 500 0.694 0.658 0.644 0.611 0.657 0.656 0.688 0.656 -0.008 0.908
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Table 3: continued 
1976-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005-08 1976-08
Time Trend 
x100 p-value
NYSE dummy
Non-NYSE 0.552 0.473 0.321 0.197 0.174 0.114 0.214 0.287 -1.396 0.000
NYSE 0.696 0.668 0.656 0.622 0.675 0.664 0.750 0.673 0.115 0.136
Institutional ownership
Low 0.429 0.239 0.142 0.111 0.081 0.190 0.199 -1.073 0.000
High 0.644 0.611 0.532 0.578 0.587 0.721 0.608 0.156 0.311
Analyst coverage
Low 0.592 0.491 0.334 0.218 0.198 0.132 0.237 0.308 -1.424 0.000
High 0.689 0.638 0.592 0.491 0.514 0.574 0.717 0.596 -0.113 0.493
Dispersion of analyst forecasts
Low 0.714 0.668 0.655 0.600 0.645 0.673 0.737 0.667 0.045 0.601
High 0.694 0.637 0.560 0.427 0.301 0.324 0.554 0.492 -1.008 0.000
Asset volatility
Low 0.650 0.609 0.566 0.522 0.576 0.550 0.692 0.590 0.002 0.989
High 0.582 0.476 0.280 0.143 0.084 0.053 0.215 0.254 -1.607 0.000
Amihud illiquidity
Low 0.726 0.682 0.648 0.551 0.567 0.586 0.725 0.627 -0.491 0.002
High 0.569 0.575 0.410 0.235 0.149 0.100 0.193 0.327 -2.084 0.000
PIN
Low 0.667 0.668 0.636 0.691 0.651 0.664 0.044 0.754
High 0.607 0.578 0.505 0.534 0.350 0.526 -0.984 0.000
Roll effective spread
Low 0.696 0.653 0.620 0.545 0.542 0.476 0.608 0.586 -0.747 0.000
High 0.620 0.606 0.444 0.230 0.172 0.226 0.389 0.375 -1.781 0.000
Abnormal earnings
Low 0.604 0.524 0.423 0.308 0.306 0.332 0.495 0.420 -0.625 0.006
High 0.636 0.580 0.472 0.361 0.360 0.329 0.576 0.465 -0.633 0.004
Credit quality
Speculative grade 0.777 0.797 0.876 0.830 0.878 0.832 0.488 0.001
Investment grade 0.732 0.685 0.700 0.675 0.702 0.697 -0.139 0.148
Dividend dummy
Non-payer 0.469 0.391 0.290 0.202 0.196 0.192 0.370 0.294 -0.603 0.002
Payer 0.671 0.643 0.623 0.566 0.616 0.600 0.679 0.625 -0.062 0.425
Positive net income
Low 0.404 0.344 0.221 0.153 0.106 0.086 0.198 0.211 -0.938 0.000
High 0.639 0.598 0.538 0.433 0.461 0.485 0.623 0.534 -0.284 0.056
Cash
Low 0.585 0.530 0.448 0.391 0.472 0.471 0.661 0.501 0.076 0.661
High 0.654 0.580 0.445 0.272 0.166 0.146 0.304 0.360 -1.648 0.000
Listing year
<1980 0.621 0.593 0.570 0.520 0.570 0.590 0.641 0.584 0.039 0.623
1980-1989 0.287 0.270 0.250 0.362 0.349 0.496 0.330 0.774 0.000
1990-1999 0.168 0.159 0.196 0.478 0.238 1.839 0.001
2000-2008 0.058 0.427 0.222 6.581 0.003
Age
New list 0.507 0.343 0.264 0.165 0.140 0.081 0.445 0.266 -0.686 0.016
Old list 0.651 0.605 0.543 0.438 0.469 0.431 0.552 0.522 -0.543 0.000
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Table 4 
Median Debt Maturity by Industry 
This table reports median debt maturity, defined as the percentage of debt maturing in more than three years, by 
industry. The industry breakdown is based on 49 industry groups classification of Fama and French (1997). The 
sample consists of observations on Compustat firms from 1976 to 2008. Financial industries (SIC codes 6000-6999) 
and utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999) are omitted. Refer to Table A.1 in the Appendix for variables definitions.  
 
  
1976 2008 1976 2008
Agriculture    0.488 0.481 0.388 0.264 0.493 0.577 0.615 0.467 0.469 0.138 0.15 0.99 13 7
Food Products   0.556 0.505 0.568 0.523 0.487 0.509 0.621 0.535 0.067 0.539 4.34 2.61 94 44
Candy & Soda  0.665 0.717 0.708 0.488 0.387 0.673 0.679 0.613 -0.307 0.291 0.25 0.31 14 9
Beer & Liquor  0.609 0.601 0.708 0.639 0.512 0.447 0.487 0.573 -0.674 0.009 1.47 1.87 12 7
Tobacco Products   0.699 0.564 0.429 0.644 0.482 0.609 0.661 0.578 0.061 0.812 0.68 1.98 6 5
Recreation    0.562 0.444 0.362 0.202 0.126 0.148 0.242 0.292 -1.326 0.000 0.31 0.23 31 18
Entertainment    0.671 0.608 0.529 0.459 0.528 0.685 0.723 0.595 0.207 0.421 0.42 0.36 30 40
Printing and Publishing  0.662 0.610 0.477 0.502 0.520 0.591 0.666 0.570 0.042 0.855 0.66 0.27 36 23
Consumer Goods   0.570 0.590 0.479 0.369 0.413 0.417 0.489 0.472 -0.513 0.001 2.69 3.51 75 39
Apparel    0.557 0.450 0.391 0.268 0.178 0.273 0.273 0.337 -1.024 0.000 0.48 0.48 77 31
Healthcare    0.765 0.723 0.494 0.353 0.432 0.465 0.605 0.540 -0.792 0.007 0.14 0.62 27 59
Medical Equipment   0.581 0.396 0.202 0.120 0.061 0.038 0.220 0.221 -1.431 0.000 0.39 2.20 32 84
Pharmaceutical Products   0.458 0.460 0.271 0.167 0.096 0.133 0.129 0.242 -1.351 0.000 3.73 12.97 37 174
Chemicals    0.700 0.609 0.585 0.541 0.627 0.600 0.663 0.614 -0.043 0.684 6.01 1.73 77 62
Rubber and Plastic Products 0.658 0.569 0.490 0.400 0.561 0.427 0.454 0.506 -0.578 0.001 0.60 0.22 51 19
Textiles    0.612 0.609 0.582 0.567 0.646 0.537 0.553 0.587 -0.184 0.320 0.55 0.06 61 6
Construction Materials   0.658 0.605 0.595 0.501 0.590 0.452 0.634 0.572 -0.294 0.038 3.10 0.75 145 49
Construction    0.436 0.424 0.348 0.212 0.252 0.505 0.678 0.399 0.542 0.059 0.31 0.67 42 33
Steel Works 0.692 0.623 0.578 0.537 0.652 0.554 0.695 0.614 -0.041 0.816 1.92 0.79 72 34
Fabricated Products   0.608 0.452 0.471 0.284 0.461 0.327 0.361 0.420 -0.622 0.067 0.11 0.05 19 7
Machinery    0.603 0.555 0.404 0.296 0.317 0.335 0.520 0.425 -0.595 0.007 2.95 2.70 141 88
Electrical Equipment   0.671 0.596 0.465 0.352 0.336 0.349 0.274 0.432 -1.330 0.000 1.34 0.92 49 56
Automobiles and Trucks  0.600 0.608 0.528 0.338 0.393 0.399 0.564 0.484 -0.547 0.009 6.96 0.54 62 36
Aircraft    0.620 0.607 0.611 0.583 0.625 0.634 0.676 0.621 0.151 0.242 1.12 2.05 27 17
Shipbuilding, Railroad Equip. 0.614 0.603 0.731 0.565 0.624 0.589 0.781 0.641 0.185 0.350 0.32 0.41 14 10
Defense    0.675 0.792 0.605 0.401 0.383 0.349 0.693 0.549 -0.871 0.070 0.24 0.56 8 8
Precious Metals   0.523 0.348 0.210 0.216 0.574 0.253 0.881 0.413 0.830 0.131 0.14 0.29 5 2
Non-Metallic Ind. Metal Mining 0.714 0.598 0.575 0.540 0.581 0.524 0.733 0.602 -0.044 0.847 0.54 0.58 14 15
Coal    0.667 0.601 0.585 0.355 0.613 0.546 0.861 0.594 0.372 0.322 0.25 0.31 8 14
Petroleum and Natural Gas 0.628 0.477 0.430 0.466 0.640 0.682 0.834 0.586 0.940 0.000 19.25 11.74 110 141
Communication    0.754 0.761 0.716 0.626 0.801 0.723 0.805 0.738 0.106 0.393 8.70 8.40 47 89
Personal Services   0.589 0.613 0.426 0.536 0.491 0.406 0.611 0.520 -0.230 0.303 0.18 0.37 23 30
Business Services   0.455 0.445 0.250 0.195 0.152 0.121 0.210 0.257 -1.099 0.000 0.94 2.09 92 145
Computers    0.512 0.369 0.174 0.052 0.029 0.144 0.188 0.201 -1.143 0.000 1.81 2.61 41 39
Computer Software   0.516 0.214 0.086 0.012 0.000 0.000 0.022 0.112 -1.401 0.000 7.42 5.64 17 138
Electronic Equipment   0.519 0.480 0.353 0.169 0.169 0.094 0.233 0.283 -1.365 0.000 2.15 4.94 103 139
Measuring and Control Equip. 0.556 0.540 0.426 0.223 0.207 0.229 0.183 0.336 -1.425 0.000 0.54 1.10 51 50
Business Supplies   0.699 0.668 0.586 0.533 0.583 0.603 0.679 0.617 -0.153 0.284 3.89 1.57 68 37
Shipping Containers   0.721 0.571 0.622 0.547 0.738 0.732 0.685 0.657 0.272 0.173 0.68 0.31 21 10
Transportation    0.672 0.643 0.636 0.594 0.568 0.591 0.723 0.629 -0.041 0.756 2.60 3.26 73 84
Wholesale    0.517 0.457 0.341 0.226 0.260 0.203 0.483 0.347 -0.570 0.016 1.34 1.53 127 93
Retail    0.690 0.646 0.592 0.516 0.494 0.477 0.582 0.567 -0.579 0.000 5.34 8.48 209 141
Restaraunts, Hotels, Motels  0.704 0.645 0.582 0.508 0.521 0.566 0.754 0.604 -0.075 0.667 0.87 1.79 58 50
Almost Nothing   0.533 0.356 0.236 0.225 0.161 0.220 0.473 0.303 -0.438 0.103 2.11 5.15 20 20
1995-99 2000-04 2005-081976-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94
Nr. of Firms
1976-08
Time 
Trend 
x100 p-value
Market Cap. 
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Table 5 
Panel Regression of Debt Maturity 
This table reports OLS, fixed effects and cross-sectional (Fama-MacBeth procedure) regressions of debt maturity 
defined as the percentage of debt maturing in more than three years. The sample consists of observations on 
Compustat firms from 1976 to 2008. Financial industries (SIC codes 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999) 
are omitted. Refer to Table A.1 in the Appendix for variables definitions. Robust t-statistics adjusted for firm-level 
clustering are in parentheses. 
 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
OLS OLS FE OLS OLS FE
FM 1976-
1989
FM 1990-
2008
Size 1.110 1.084 0.713 1.109 1.084 0.713 0.925 1.171
(51.70) (51.51) (20.91) (51.49) (51.51) (20.91) (16.75) (48.52)
Size squared -0.852 -0.844 -0.505 -0.850 -0.844 -0.505 -0.712 -0.896
(-32.25) (-32.50) (-12.98) (-32.03) (-32.50) (-12.98) (-14.40) (-27.40)
Market-to-book -0.017 -0.017 -0.012 -0.017 -0.017 -0.012 -0.019 -0.021
(-22.50) (-22.13) (-12.69) (-22.52) (-22.13) (-12.69) (-10.69) (-13.43)
Abnormal earnings 0.024 0.021 0.016 0.023 0.021 0.016 0.038 0.016
(11.85) (10.99) (8.19) (11.57) (10.99) (8.19) (7.69) (3.00)
Asset maturity 0.003 0.002 0.000 0.003 0.002 0.000 0.003 0.003
(13.43) (9.05) (1.20) (13.30) (9.05) (1.20) (8.37) (29.68)
Asset volatility -0.166 -0.128 -0.019 -0.161 -0.128 -0.019 -0.165 -0.129
(-27.21) (-20.31) (-2.94) (-26.43) (-20.31) (-2.94) (-18.22) (-17.32)
Leverage 0.398 0.395 0.350 0.398 0.395 0.350 0.227 0.502
(44.09) (43.53) (29.26) (44.05) (43.53) (29.26) (14.26) (22.58)
R&D -0.185 -0.159 -0.097 -0.176 -0.159 -0.097 -0.151 -0.153
(-12.25) (-9.97) (-3.94) (-11.53) (-9.97) (-3.94) (-7.78) (-10.89)
Term spread -0.013 -0.001 -0.002 -0.011 -0.001 -0.002
(-14.75) (-0.76) (-1.39) (-13.20) (-0.76) (-1.39)
Time trend x100 -0.116 -0.192 -0.223
(-6.01) (-7.02) (-6.30)
Intercept 0.260 0.276 0.346 0.190
(51.34) (47.18) (18.97) (21.48)
Year dummies No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No No
Industry dummies No Yes No No Yes No No No
Observations 97215 97215 97215 97215 97215 97215 39628 57587
R-squared 0.304 0.331 0.605 0.305 0.331 0.605 0.230 0.334
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Table 6 
Robustness of Panel Regression of Debt Maturity 
This table reports several alternative regression models of debt maturity defined as the percentage of debt maturing 
in more than three years. The sample consists of observations on Compustat firms from 1976 to 2008. Financial 
industries (SIC codes 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999) are omitted. Refer to Table A.1 in the 
Appendix for variables definitions. Robust t-statistics adjusted for firm-level clustering are in parentheses. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS Tobit Changes OLS OLS OLS OLS Debt3
ln(Debt3) Debt3 Debt3 Debt3 Debt3 Debt3 Estimate Interaction Interaction
1976-1989 1990s 2000s
Size 5.259 1.300 0.330 0.914 0.626 1.106 0.9676 0.1724 0.2630
(28.84) (52.88) (11.75) (34.99) (19.06) (51.55) (33.28) (4.48) (5.65)
Size squared -4.004 -1.003 -0.197 -0.858 -0.609 -0.849 -0.7466 -0.1214 -0.2035
(-21.93) (-34.02) (-5.91) (-27.96) (-17.08) (-32.12) (-22.12) (-2.72) (-3.77)
Market-to-book -0.125 -0.026 -0.006 -0.011 -0.012 -0.017 -0.0162 -0.0009 -0.0020
(-5.10) (-18.29) (-7.86) (-13.27) (-11.03) (-22.18) (-13.26) (-0.56) (-1.09)
Abnormal earnings 0.117 0.028 0.011 0.018 0.025 0.023 0.0338 -0.0150 -0.0148
(2.87) (10.94) (7.48) (8.41) (9.24) (11.68) (9.04) (-2.83) (-3.01)
Asset maturity 0.014 0.003 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.003 0.0023 0.0003 0.0006
(7.04) (11.16) (1.33) (-0.98) (0.74) (13.38) (7.85) (0.91) (1.47)
Asset volatility -1.251 -0.222 -0.003 -0.101 -0.082 -0.158 -0.1815 0.0366 0.0457
(-9.02) (-25.38) (-0.77) (-15.76) (-11.01) (-25.97) (-16.45) (2.71) (3.04)
Leverage 1.732 0.493 0.189 0.377 0.420 0.399 0.2312 0.2327 0.2849
(18.53) (44.43) (16.56) (35.55) (33.82) (44.25) (16.59) (13.01) (13.53)
R&D -1.499 -0.338 -0.098 -0.102 -0.165 -0.179 -0.2366 0.0919 0.0782
(-3.75) (-13.30) (-5.39) (-5.58) (-7.50) (-11.84) (-6.27) (2.26) (1.80)
Lagged debt maturity -0.246
(-77.80)
Rating dummy 0.191 0.183
(30.90) (27.64)
Taxes 0.062 0.051
(11.56) (8.59)
Return on assets 0.052 0.023
(8.30) (2.85)
Cash 0.123 0.129
(10.39) (9.65)
PPE 0.236 0.243
(17.32) (15.35)
CAPEX -0.113 -0.184
(-4.01) (-5.60)
Dividend dummy 0.027 0.020
(5.00) (3.41)
Institutional ownership 0.121
(10.24)
Analyst coverage -0.000
(-0.22)
Amihud illiquidity -0.001
(-10.84)
Term spread -0.045 -0.013 -0.004 -0.008 -0.007 -0.010 -0.0104
(-3.89) (-12.54) (-5.97) (-3.63) (-3.07) (-11.81) (-12.07)
Short term rate 0.004 0.002
(3.03) (1.51)
Government share -0.006 -0.005
(-12.13) (-9.89)
Time trend x100 -1.999 -0.179 -0.105 -0.231 -0.600
(-11.72) (-7.88) (-11.90) (-4.27) (-9.44)
1990s dummy -0.049
(-14.14)
2000s dummy -0.014
(-3.34)
Intercept -1.889 0.241 0.124 0.535 0.571 0.275 0.3509 -0.1544 -0.1469
(-32.04) (33.68) (53.08) (12.95) (12.61) (52.24) (45.53) (-15.96) (-12.99)
Observations 80561 97215 78718 69361 54342 97215
R-squared 0.057 0.305 0.130 0.365 0.372 0.308
97215
0.314
(7)
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Table 7 
Predicted Debt Maturity and Deviations from Actual Debt Maturity by Year 
This table reports the differences between the actual average and predicted debt maturity, defined as the percentage of debt maturing in more than three years, 
from 1980 to 2008. The predicted values are obtained using the coefficients of the explanatory variables for the sample period prior to 1980. Estimates of this 
regression are as follows: Debt maturity = 0.411 + 0.694 Size -0.510 Size2 – 0.026 Market-to-book + 0.044 Abnormal earnings + 0.004 Asset maturity - 0.141 
Asset volatility + 0.168 Leverage – 0.125 R&D. t-statistics on the differences between actual average and predicted debt maturity are also presented. The sample 
consists of observations on Compustat firms from 1976 to 2008. Financial industries (SIC codes 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999) are omitted. 
Refer to Table A.1 in the Appendix for variables definitions. 
 
Year Actual Predicted
Actual -
Predicted t-statistic Actual Predicted
Actual -
Predicted t-statistic Actual Predicted
Actual -
Predicted t-statistic Actual Predicted
Actual -
Predicted t-statistic
1980 0.530 0.529 0.001 0.28 0.455 0.453 0.002 0.26 0.596 0.586 0.010 1.01 0.642 0.650 -0.008 -0.89
1981 0.510 0.530 -0.020 -4.14 0.429 0.457 -0.028 -3.98 0.602 0.593 0.009 0.95 0.631 0.658 -0.027 -3.14
1982 0.503 0.518 -0.015 -3.13 0.425 0.448 -0.023 -3.27 0.591 0.582 0.009 0.87 0.633 0.651 -0.018 -2.04
1983 0.487 0.500 -0.013 -2.69 0.408 0.430 -0.022 -3.33 0.573 0.571 0.002 0.22 0.645 0.645 0.000 0.03
1984 0.459 0.510 -0.051 -10.92 0.376 0.443 -0.067 -10.74 0.562 0.588 -0.026 -2.56 0.627 0.651 -0.024 -2.61
1985 0.455 0.500 -0.045 -9.10 0.369 0.431 -0.063 -9.61 0.559 0.580 -0.022 -1.96 0.641 0.650 -0.009 -0.88
1986 0.443 0.497 -0.054 -10.84 0.347 0.430 -0.082 -12.46 0.558 0.576 -0.018 -1.66 0.643 0.642 0.001 0.15
1987 0.440 0.491 -0.051 -10.15 0.347 0.427 -0.080 -12.28 0.570 0.571 -0.001 -0.06 0.639 0.637 0.002 0.21
1988 0.420 0.499 -0.078 -15.28 0.335 0.434 -0.099 -15.20 0.543 0.587 -0.044 -3.67 0.619 0.655 -0.036 -3.24
1989 0.405 0.498 -0.093 -17.57 0.314 0.432 -0.117 -17.78 0.547 0.591 -0.045 -3.45 0.605 0.653 -0.048 -4.22
1990 0.384 0.500 -0.116 -22.21 0.295 0.437 -0.142 -21.79 0.519 0.581 -0.062 -5.01 0.571 0.649 -0.078 -6.57
1991 0.381 0.490 -0.109 -20.78 0.285 0.427 -0.141 -21.04 0.483 0.548 -0.064 -5.58 0.588 0.638 -0.050 -4.33
1992 0.372 0.491 -0.119 -23.26 0.278 0.422 -0.144 -21.81 0.451 0.556 -0.104 -9.43 0.591 0.644 -0.053 -4.65
1993 0.380 0.488 -0.107 -21.62 0.272 0.416 -0.144 -23.13 0.491 0.555 -0.064 -5.57 0.603 0.641 -0.038 -3.52
1994 0.383 0.493 -0.111 -22.53 0.277 0.422 -0.144 -23.71 0.516 0.574 -0.058 -4.96 0.596 0.648 -0.052 -4.74
1995 0.384 0.481 -0.097 -19.53 0.287 0.415 -0.128 -21.00 0.494 0.548 -0.054 -4.49 0.598 0.633 -0.035 -3.17
1996 0.394 0.469 -0.075 -15.49 0.301 0.405 -0.104 -17.20 0.507 0.543 -0.035 -2.98 0.610 0.625 -0.015 -1.39
1997 0.409 0.461 -0.051 -10.10 0.315 0.397 -0.082 -13.39 0.562 0.551 0.011 0.86 0.627 0.619 0.008 0.74
1998 0.409 0.464 -0.055 -10.56 0.321 0.406 -0.085 -13.20 0.558 0.552 0.006 0.45 0.600 0.600 -0.001 -0.05
1999 0.381 0.454 -0.073 -13.60 0.304 0.408 -0.104 -15.18 0.470 0.517 -0.046 -3.67 0.520 0.530 -0.010 -0.86
2000 0.346 0.451 -0.105 -19.38 0.258 0.396 -0.138 -20.88 0.414 0.514 -0.100 -7.70 0.555 0.562 -0.007 -0.56
2001 0.363 0.450 -0.088 -15.06 0.248 0.380 -0.132 -18.55 0.480 0.533 -0.053 -3.75 0.627 0.603 0.024 1.84
2002 0.381 0.493 -0.111 -18.19 0.259 0.423 -0.165 -21.74 0.523 0.574 -0.051 -3.35 0.635 0.635 0.000 -0.01
2003 0.423 0.487 -0.063 -9.95 0.305 0.402 -0.097 -11.60 0.551 0.569 -0.018 -1.17 0.613 0.631 -0.019 -1.51
2004 0.459 0.491 -0.032 -4.87 0.338 0.408 -0.071 -8.10 0.625 0.575 0.050 3.19 0.630 0.630 -0.001 -0.06
2005 0.481 0.494 -0.013 -1.93 0.357 0.410 -0.053 -5.58 0.631 0.567 0.064 4.06 0.646 0.632 0.014 1.14
2006 0.506 0.495 0.010 1.51 0.380 0.408 -0.029 -2.98 0.671 0.580 0.090 5.70 0.672 0.635 0.037 3.15
2007 0.499 0.503 -0.004 -0.55 0.371 0.419 -0.048 -4.82 0.651 0.583 0.068 4.38 0.671 0.633 0.039 3.16
2008 0.456 0.513 -0.058 -7.99 0.307 0.425 -0.118 -11.52 0.577 0.577 0.000 -0.01 0.650 0.637 0.014 1.11
Large firmsAll firms Small firms Medium firms
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Table 8 
Panel Regression of Debt Maturity with Listing Groups 
This table reports OLS regressions of debt maturity defined as the percentage of debt maturing in more than three 
years. The explanatory variables include listing group dummy variables defined by decades. The sample consists of 
observations on Compustat firms from 1976 to 2008. Financial industries (SIC codes 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC 
codes 4900-4999) are omitted. Refer to Table A.1 in the Appendix for variables definitions. Robust t-statistics 
adjusted for firm-level clustering are in parentheses. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pre-1980 listing dummy 0.520 0.279 0.281
(111.91) (46.62) (42.98)
1980-1989 listing dummy 0.353 0.244 0.243
(52.12) (33.57) (32.93)
1990-1999 listing dummy 0.328 0.227 0.224
(42.52) (29.69) (26.99)
2000-2008 listing dummy 0.311 0.241 0.236
(30.03) (25.57) (22.03)
Size 1.092 1.111 1.090
(49.92) (51.25) (49.48)
Size squared -0.853 -0.875 -0.846
(-31.86) (-31.84) (-30.29)
Market-to-book -0.017 -0.017 -0.017
(-21.57) (-22.10) (-21.63)
Abnormal earnings 0.022 0.023 0.022
(11.33) (11.51) (11.32)
Asset maturity 0.002 0.002 0.002
(12.65) (12.79) (12.67)
Asset volatility -0.144 -0.152 -0.144
(-23.09) (-24.56) (-23.16)
Leverage 0.406 0.401 0.405
(44.55) (44.09) (44.53)
R&D -0.175 -0.176 -0.174
(-11.47) (-11.55) (-11.42)
Term spread -0.011 -0.011 -0.011
(-12.53) (-13.25) (-12.51)
Age 0.001 -0.000
(4.78) (-1.00)
Time trend x100 -0.376 0.152 -0.001 -0.131 0.001
(-15.73) (5.31) (-0.43) (-6.66) (0.36)
Intercept 0.502 0.267
(111.84) (44.73)
Observations 97215 97215 97215 97215 97215
R-squared 0.010 0.644 0.736 0.306 0.736
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Table 9 
Average and Median Initial Maturity of New Bond Issues and Syndicated Loans by Year 
This table reports the average and median initial maturity (in years) of new bond issues and syndicated loans by year. 
The table also contains breakdown of new issues and loans by size, age, and rating groups. In Panel A the sample 
consists of Mergent Fixed Income Securities Database (FISD) bond issues by firms with Compustat identifiers from 
1976 to 2008.  In Panel B the sample consists of Loan Pricing Corporation’s Dealscan loan facilities by firms with 
Compustat identifiers from 1987 to 2008. Financial industries (SIC codes 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC codes 4900-
4999) are omitted. Refer to Table A.1 in the Appendix for variables definitions. 
 
Average 
Maturity
Median 
Maturity
Nr. of 
Issues Small Medium Large New Old Unrated
Spec. 
Grade
Invest. 
Grade
1976 25.6 25.0 36 3% 97% 0% 3% 97%
1977 23.4 25.0 19 11% 26% 63% 11% 89%
1978 23.0 20.0 26 15% 19% 65% 4% 96%
1979 24.1 25.0 30 7% 30% 63% 3% 97%
1980 20.3 20.0 76 3% 21% 76% 5% 95%
1981 20.2 20.0 42 10% 19% 71% 2% 98%
1982 16.3 15.0 51 6% 18% 76% 6% 94%
1983 17.3 19.0 82 13% 27% 60% 11% 89%
1984 16.4 15.0 65 11% 22% 68% 18% 82%
1985 16.3 15.0 149 10% 22% 68% 17% 83%
1986 17.4 15.0 233 12% 23% 65% 18% 82% 6% 34% 60%
1987 17.8 19.5 164 12% 21% 66% 17% 83% 7% 36% 57%
1988 14.2 10.5 116 8% 18% 74% 21% 79% 4% 29% 66%
1989 14.8 13.0 194 2% 11% 87% 8% 92% 2% 15% 83%
1990 12.4 11.0 158 3% 5% 92% 9% 91% 1% 9% 90%
1991 15.5 12.0 194 3% 5% 92% 10% 90% 4% 13% 83%
1992 13.2 10.0 248 4% 13% 83% 11% 89% 5% 33% 62%
1993 14.3 10.0 260 14% 20% 66% 18% 82% 11% 33% 56%
1994 11.6 10.0 113 9% 24% 67% 24% 76% 10% 36% 54%
1995 13.9 10.0 184 9% 22% 68% 22% 78% 6% 36% 58%
1996 14.1 10.0 305 18% 19% 63% 29% 71% 13% 38% 50%
1997 15.1 10.0 422 18% 32% 50% 36% 64% 12% 49% 39%
1998 12.1 10.0 560 22% 19% 59% 33% 67% 9% 51% 39%
1999 11.1 10.0 402 11% 17% 72% 24% 76% 6% 41% 53%
2000 9.3 7.0 311 5% 13% 81% 34% 66% 8% 41% 51%
2001 9.9 8.0 523 7% 21% 72% 15% 85% 8% 36% 56%
2002 9.5 8.0 427 13% 24% 63% 14% 86% 8% 41% 51%
2003 12.2 10.0 598 14% 27% 59% 12% 88% 16% 46% 38%
2004 12.1 10.0 583 22% 27% 51% 12% 88% 17% 54% 29%
2005 11.9 10.0 430 21% 25% 54% 14% 86% 18% 50% 32%
2006 11.9 10.0 419 14% 18% 68% 9% 91% 17% 43% 40%
2007 11.9 9.0 540 19% 18% 63% 11% 89% 21% 37% 42%
2008 11.5 9.0 320 7% 15% 78% 13% 87% 14% 23% 63%
1976-1979 24.0 23.8 9% 43% 48% 5% 95%
1980-1984 18.1 17.8 8% 21% 70% 9% 91%
1985-1989 16.1 14.6 9% 19% 72% 16% 84% 5% 29% 67%
1990-1994 13.4 10.6 7% 13% 80% 14% 86% 6% 25% 69%
1995-1999 13.3 10.0 16% 22% 63% 29% 71% 9% 43% 48%
2000-2004 10.6 8.6 12% 22% 65% 17% 83% 11% 44% 45%
2005-2008 11.8 9.5 15% 19% 66% 12% 88% 18% 38% 44%
1976-2008 15.2 13.4 11% 22% 67% 15% 85% 10% 36% 54%
Time trend -0.393 -0.475
p-value 0.000 0.000
Panel A: Bond Issues
Year
Percent of Issues by Size
Percent of Issues 
by Age Percent of Issues by RatingSyndicated Loans
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Table 9: continued 
 
  
Year
Average 
Maturity
Median 
Maturity
Nr. of 
Facilities Small Medium Large New Old Unrated
Spec. 
Grade
Invest. 
Grade
1987 4.2 4.0 1,663 27% 32% 41% 31% 69% 51% 26% 23%
1988 4.0 4.0 3,968 38% 29% 33% 36% 64% 56% 26% 19%
1989 4.5 4.6 3,167 45% 28% 27% 36% 64% 68% 19% 12%
1990 4.2 3.8 3,304 43% 32% 25% 38% 62% 69% 18% 13%
1991 3.5 3.0 2,838 43% 35% 22% 42% 58% 68% 21% 11%
1992 3.8 3.0 4,265 42% 32% 26% 38% 62% 69% 20% 11%
1993 3.6 3.0 5,042 36% 34% 30% 42% 58% 64% 21% 15%
1994 3.9 3.5 6,475 37% 28% 34% 41% 59% 64% 20% 16%
1995 4.0 4.1 5,474 38% 28% 34% 40% 60% 60% 23% 17%
1996 4.0 4.0 7,409 48% 27% 25% 48% 52% 65% 22% 12%
1997 4.2 4.9 8,558 46% 27% 27% 48% 52% 61% 24% 14%
1998 4.2 4.8 7,275 54% 22% 24% 44% 56% 57% 30% 13%
1999 3.9 3.9 6,263 44% 28% 28% 36% 64% 54% 28% 17%
2000 3.4 3.0 5,513 39% 26% 36% 33% 67% 48% 25% 27%
2001 3.0 3.0 5,907 37% 25% 38% 25% 75% 42% 25% 33%
2002 3.1 3.0 6,029 43% 22% 35% 20% 80% 47% 25% 28%
2003 3.2 3.0 5,489 36% 25% 39% 17% 83% 42% 31% 27%
2004 4.0 5.0 6,166 37% 24% 39% 14% 86% 40% 32% 28%
2005 4.5 5.0 6,168 33% 26% 41% 15% 85% 39% 35% 26%
2006 4.5 5.0 5,010 34% 28% 38% 14% 86% 39% 35% 25%
2007 4.6 5.0 4,600 36% 25% 40% 17% 83% 40% 36% 24%
2008 3.8 4.2 2,548 41% 26% 33% 19% 81% 53% 29% 18%
1987-1989 4.2 4.2 37% 30% 34% 34% 66% 58% 24% 18%
1990-1994 3.8 3.3 40% 32% 28% 40% 60% 67% 20% 13%
1995-1999 4.1 4.3 46% 26% 28% 43% 57% 60% 26% 15%
2000-2004 3.3 3.4 38% 24% 37% 22% 78% 44% 28% 29%
2005-2008 4.3 4.8 36% 26% 38% 16% 84% 43% 34% 23%
1976-2008 3.9 3.9 40% 28% 33% 31% 69% 54% 26% 20%
Time trend -0.412 0.037
p-value 0.794 0.171
Syndicated Loans Percent of Loans by Size
Percent of Loans 
by Age Percent of Issues by Rating
Panel B: Syndicated Loans
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Table 10 
Regression of Initial Maturity of New Bond Issues and Syndicated Loans 
This table reports OLS and fixed effects regressions of the logarithm of initial maturity (in years) of new bond issues 
and syndicated loans by year. In Panel A the sample consists of Mergent Fixed Income Securities Database (FISD) 
bond issues by firms with Compustat identifiers from 1976 to 2008.  In Panel B the sample consists of Loan Pricing 
Corporation’s Dealscan loan facilities by firms with Compustat identifiers from 1987 to 2008. Financial industries 
(SIC codes 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999) are omitted. Refer to Table A.1 in the Appendix for 
variables definitions. Robust t-statistics adjusted for firm-level clustering are in parentheses. 
  
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS FE OLS OLS FE
Size 0.464 0.454 -0.209 0.418 0.454 -0.209
(3.19) (3.34) (-0.82) (2.99) (3.34) (-0.82)
Size squared -0.243 -0.234 0.419 -0.259 -0.234 0.419
(-1.65) (-1.69) (1.69) (-1.82) (-1.69) (1.69)
Market-to-book -0.009 0.011 0.001 0.014 0.011 0.001
(-0.70) (1.02) (0.05) (1.17) (1.02) (0.05)
Abnormal earnings 0.030 0.005 0.004 0.016 0.005 0.004
(1.60) (0.24) (0.14) (0.82) (0.24) (0.14)
Asset maturity 0.003 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.001
(2.87) (0.44) (0.26) (2.07) (0.44) (0.26)
Asset volatility -0.534 -0.376 -0.109 -0.547 -0.376 -0.109
(-8.67) (-5.64) (-0.98) (-9.29) (-5.64) (-0.98)
Leverage -0.260 -0.235 -0.227 -0.269 -0.235 -0.227
(-4.00) (-3.55) (-2.07) (-4.25) (-3.55) (-2.07)
R&D -0.775 -1.024 -0.266 -0.669 -1.024 -0.266
(-3.46) (-4.82) (-0.77) (-3.01) (-4.82) (-0.77)
Term spread -0.034 -0.029 -0.024 -0.029 -0.029 -0.024
(-4.63) (-1.37) (-0.89) (-3.74) (-1.37) (-0.89)
Time trend -0.023 -0.033 -0.032
(-19.15) (-21.62) (-11.08)
Intercept 2.358 3.279 3.135 2.898 3.313 3.167
(50.88) (24.11) (23.76) (54.44) (24.31) (23.75)
Issue type dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Industry dummies No Yes No No Yes No
Observations 8280 8280 8280 8280 8280 8280
R-squared 0.052 0.156 0.409 0.117 0.156 0.409
Panel A: Bond Issues
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Table 10: continued 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS FE OLS OLS FE
Size 0.864 0.885 0.630 0.903 0.885 0.630
(17.06) (18.10) (6.51) (18.25) (18.10) (6.51)
Size squared -0.576 -0.628 -0.365 -0.625 -0.628 -0.365
(-10.51) (-11.98) (-3.60) (-11.71) (-11.98) (-3.60)
Market-to-book -0.006 -0.014 -0.015 -0.009 -0.014 -0.015
(-1.76) (-3.95) (-2.74) (-2.68) (-3.95) (-2.74)
Abnormal earnings 0.020 0.017 0.008 0.024 0.017 0.008
(2.29) (1.98) (0.78) (2.86) (1.98) (0.78)
Asset maturity 0.001 0.000 -0.002 0.001 0.000 -0.002
(1.70) (0.24) (-2.15) (1.43) (0.24) (-2.15)
Asset volatility -0.304 -0.232 -0.095 -0.291 -0.232 -0.095
(-11.22) (-8.51) (-2.43) (-10.85) (-8.51) (-2.43)
Leverage 0.168 0.169 0.079 0.206 0.169 0.079
(6.84) (7.11) (2.12) (8.45) (7.11) (2.12)
R&D -0.588 -0.508 0.492 -0.539 -0.508 0.492
(-6.63) (-5.57) (2.60) (-6.27) (-5.57) (2.60)
Term spread -0.047 -0.018 -0.013 -0.041 -0.018 -0.013
(-13.72) (-1.77) (-1.27) (-12.11) (-1.77) (-1.27)
Time trend 0.015 0.009 0.005
(16.44) (3.96) (1.68)
Intercept -0.102 -0.391 -0.250 -0.498 -0.504 -0.305
(-4.04) (-4.60) (-3.96) (-14.14) (-4.95) (-3.44)
Loan purpose and type dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Industry dummies No Yes No No Yes No
Observations 113122 113122 113122 113122 113122 113122
R-squared 0.587 0.607 0.746 0.597 0.607 0.746
Panel B: Syndicated Loans
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Figure 1 
Median Debt Maturity and Number of Firms by Size Group 
Panel A plots number of firms and Panel B median debt maturity, defined as the percentage of debt maturing in 
more than three years, of each size group. The breakpoints for the three size groups are the 20th and 50th NYSE 
percentiles of market capitalization in each year. The sample consists of observations on Compustat firms from 1976 
to 2008. Financial industries (SIC codes 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999) are omitted.  
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Figure 2 
Median Debt Maturity by Listing Group and Number of New Listings 
Panel A plots number of new listings and Panel B median debt maturity, defined as the percentage of debt maturing 
in more than three years, of each listing group. The breakpoints for the three size groups are the 20th and 50th 
NYSE percentiles of market capitalization in each year. The sample consists of observations on Compustat firms 
from 1976 to 2008. Financial industries (SIC codes 6000-6999) and utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999) are omitted.  
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Figure 3 
Debt Maturity and Industry Composition 
This figure plots the actual median debt maturity, defined as the percentage of debt maturing in more than three 
years, and the average debt maturity from applying 1976 industry weights to the median debt maturity across 
industries in each year. The industry breakdown is based on 49 industry groups classification of Fama and French 
(1997). The sample consists of observations on Compustat firms from 1976 to 2008. Financial industries (SIC codes 
6000-6999) and utilities (SIC codes 4900-4999) are omitted.  
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Figure 4 
Share of Public Debt in Total Corporate Debt Financing 
This figure plots the volume of public debt as a fraction of total debt financing by nonfarm nonfinancial corporate 
debt compiled from annual Flow of Funds Accounts (Federal Reserve) data from 1976 to 2008. Total debt financing 
is the sum of bank debt and public debt. Bank debt is the sum of the Flow of Funds balance sheet components Other 
Loans and Advances and Banks Loans Not Elsewhere Classified. Public debt is the sum of the Flow of Funds 
balance sheet components Commercial Paper Issued by Nonfinancial Firms and Corporate Bonds. 
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Appendix 
Table A.1 
Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
Leverage Ratio of total debt (DLTT) to book value of assets (AT) 
Debt maturity 1 Ratio of total long-term debt (DLTT) to book value of total debt (TD) 
Debt maturity 2 Ratio of total long-term debt (DLTT) minus debt maturing in two years (DD2) to book value of total debt (TD) 
Debt maturity 3 Ratio of total long-term debt (DLTT) minus debt maturing in two and three years (DD2+DD3) to book value of total debt 
(TD) 
Debt maturity 4 Ratio of total long-term debt (DLTT) minus debt maturing in two, three and four years (DD2+DD3+DD4) to book value 
of total debt (TD) 
Debt maturity 5 Ratio of total long-term debt (DLTT) minus debt maturing in two, three, four and five years (DD2+DD3+DD4+DD5) to 
book value of total debt (TD) 
Market capitalization Number of shares outstanding (CSHO) times stock price at the fiscal year-end (PRCC_F) 
Size Percent of NYSE firms that have the same or smaller market capitalization 
Market-to-book Ratio of market value of assets (AT+CSHOxPRCC_F-CEQ) to book value of total assets (AT) 
Abnormal earnings Ratio of difference between the income before extraordinary items, adjusted for common/ordinary stock (capital) 
equivalents (IBADJ) for time t and t-1 over the market value of equity used to calculate earnings per share (PRCC_Fx 
CSHPRI) 
Assets maturity Ratio of property, plant and equipment (PPEGT) over depreciation and amortization (DP) times the proportion of 
property, plant  and equipment in total assets (PPEGT/AT), plus the ratio of current assets (ACT) over the cost of goods 
sold (COGS) times the proportion of current assets in total assets (ACT/AT) 
Assets volatility Standard deviation of stock return during the fiscal year times market value of equity (CSHOxPRCC_F) divided by 
market value of assets (AT+CSHOxPRCC_F-CEQ) 
R&D Ratio of research and development expenditures (XRD) to book value of assets (AT) 
Age Number of years between fiscal year (FYEAR) and CRSP listing year (LISTYEAR) 
CAPEX Ratio of capital expenditures (CAPX) to book value of assets (AT) 
Asset growth Book value of assets (AT) in year t over book value of assets in year t-1 minus one 
PPE Ratio of net property, plant and equipment (PPNT) to book value of assets (AT) 
Rating dummy Dummy variable that takes the value of one if a firm has a S&P domestic long-term issuer credit rating (SPLTICRM) 
Investment grade dummy Dummy variable that takes the value of one if a firm has a credit rating BBB- or above 
Speculative grade dummy Dummy variable that takes the value of one if a firm has credit rating BB+ or below 
S&P 500 dummy Dummy variable that takes the value of one if a firm is a member of the S&P 500 index (CPSPIN) 
NYSE dummy Dummy variable that takes the value of one if a firm is a listed on the NYSE (EXCHG) 
Institutional ownership Number of shares held by institutions divided by the number of shares outstanding (Thomson CDA/Spectrum 13F 
Holdings) 
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Table A.1: continued 
Variable Definition 
Analyst coverage Number of analysts covering a firm (NUMEST) 
Dispersion of analyst forecasts Standard deviation of analyst forecasts (STDEV x 100) over book value of total assets (AT)  
Amihud illiquidity Average of the ratio of the absolute stock return over the dollar volume (Amihud (2002)) 
PIN Probability of information-based trading, defined as the ratio of the expected number of informed trades over the expected 
total number of trades (Easley, Hvidkjaer, and O’Hara (2002)) 
Roll effective spread Square root of minus of autocovariance of log price change estimated over all trading days in the year; variable is set to 
zero if the autocovariance is negative (Roll (1984)) 
Positive net income Dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm has positive net income (NI) 
Return on assets Ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) to book value of total assets (AT) 
Dividend dummy Dummy variable that takes the value of one if the firm pays dividends (DVC) and zero otherwise 
Cash Ratio of cash and short-term investments (CHE) over book value of total assets (AT) 
Taxes Ratio of total income taxes (TXT) over the pretax income (PI) 
Governance index Governance index of Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003), which is based on 24 antitakeover provisions (IRRC) 
Managerial ownership Number of shares held by top five managers divided by the number of shares outstanding (ExecuComp) 
Board independence Ratio of number of independent directors to board size (IRRC) 
Term spread Difference between month-end yield on ten-year government bonds and month-end yield on one-year government bonds 
(Federal Reserve) 
Short term rate Month-end yield on one-year government bonds (Federal Reserve) 
Government share Share of government debt and coupon payments with maturity of one year or more (Greenwood, Hanson, and Stein 
(2010)) 
 
 
